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Adversarial Failure  
 
Benjamin P. Edwards* 
Abstract 
Investors, industry firms, and regulators all rely on vital 
public records to assess risk and evaluate securities industry 
personnel. Despite the information’s importance, an 
arbitration-facilitated expungement process now regularly 
deletes these public records. Often, these arbitrations recommend 
that public information be deleted without any true adversary 
ever providing any critical scrutiny to the requests. In essence, 
poorly informed arbitrators facilitate removing public 
information out of public databases. Interventions aimed at 
surfacing information may yield better informed decisions. 
Although similar problems have emerged in other contexts when 
adversarial systems break down, the expungement process to 
purge information about financial professionals provides a 
unique case study. 
Multiple interventions may combine to more effectively 
surface information and generate better informed decisions. In 
quasi-ex parte proceedings, traditional attorney ethics rules 
must yield to a higher duty of candor. Yet adjudicators should 
not rely on duty alone. Adversarial scrutiny may emerge by 
designating an advocate to independently and critically engage 
in circumstances where no party has any real incentive to oppose 
an outcome. Ultimately, addressing adversarial failures may 
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require a shift away from adversarial adjudication to a more 
regulatory framework. 
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I. Introduction 
Customer complaints about stockbrokers (brokers), 
misconduct findings, and other information have long been 
public record. The public disclosures for Gregory Brian 
VanWinkle, a broker affiliated with Essex Securities, reveal a 
history of problems detailed in seven different disclosures.1 In 
2013, Securities America discharged him for violating the firm’s 
policy related to client signatures.2 Arising from this incident, 
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) also 
brought a disciplinary action against him which culminated in 
a fine of $5,000 and a twenty-day suspension.3 The public record 
 
 1. See Gregory Brian VanWinkle, BROKERCHECK, https://perma.cc
/KXP7-U53R (providing the employment history and public disclosure record 
of VanWinkle).  
 2. See id. (detailing that VanWinkle was discharged due to an allegation 
that he “violated firm policy relating to client signatures”).  
 3. See Letter of Acceptance, Waiver, and Consent No. 2013038209301 
from Gregory Van Winkle to Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth. 2 (June 29, 2015), https://
 
  
1056 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053 (2020) 
 
includes three customer disputes, two of which resulted in 
settlements.4 But these public disclosures only tell part of the 
story.  
VanWinkle erased another twenty-four customer disputes 
and some now unknowable number of settlements from the 
public record with one weird trick. In 2017, he filed an 
arbitration claim against a former employer, IFS Securities.5 
IFS never responded to the action and did not file any answer.6 
Importantly, VanWinkle did not seek any damages from IFS 
Securities.7 He filed the action to secure an arbitration award 
declaring that the twenty-four customer complaints should not 
be on his record because they were either false or that he had 
nothing to do with the alleged misconduct.8 He succeeded and 
obtained the arbitration award after a single fact-finding 
hearing lasting four hours or less.9  
 
perma.cc/XA38-UTDV (detailing that VanWinkle agreed to “[a twenty] 
business-day suspension from association with any FINRA firm in any 
capacity and a $5,000 fine”).  
 4. See Gregory Brian VanWinkle, supra note 1 (reporting that one 
customer dispute was denied and two other customer disputes were settled).  
 5. See VanWinkle v. IFS Sec., Inc., No. 17-02465, 2018 WL 4051277, at 
*1 (Aug. 13, 2018) (Ver Beek, Arb.) (memorializing VanWinkle’s arbitration 
claim).  
 6. See infra Part II.C.1.d and accompanying text (explaining why 
brokerages do not oppose these requests); see also VanWinkle, 2018 WL 
4051277, at *1 (noting that IFS “did not file with FINRA Office of Dispute 
Resolution a properly executed [s]ubmission [a]greement” and that IFS “did 
not participate in the expungement hearing”).  
 7. See VanWinkle, 2018 WL 4051277, at *1 (stating that VanWinkle’s 
requested relief was only for “expungement of the [u]nderlying [c]laims from 
his registration records maintained by the [Central Registration Depository]”).  
 8. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 2080 (2009) (setting out the 
requirements for expungement awards); see also VanWinkle, 2018 WL 
4051277, at *2 (supporting VanWinkle’s expungement claim on the basis that 
the underlying issues in the customer’s complaints were not VanWinkle’s fault 
but rather the fault of the issuer of the security).  
 9. See VanWinkle, 2018 WL 4051277, at *2 (reporting that the arbitrator 
found in favor of VanWinkle’s expungement argument). Within the FINRA 
forum, a hearing session lasts for four hours or less. See Summary of 
Arbitration Fees, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc/9L8N-APY6 (“A 
hearing session is any meeting between the parties and arbitrator(s) of four 
hours or less, including a hearing or a prehearing conference.”).  
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A traditional, adversarial fact-finding process may have 
yielded a substantially different result. With no opposing voice 
in the room, VanWinkle successfully shifted the blame to a third 
party who played no role in the arbitration—an insurance 
company who accurately described its offering in its 
prospectus.10 In granting VanWinkle’s request, the arbitrator 
found that VanWinkle “sold a particular annuity product to 
many customers” and that he “was familiar with this product 
from sales meetings and prior sales to several customers.”11 
Implicitly acknowledging that VanWinkle did not understand 
the product he sold, the arbitrator found that “[a]pparently the 
issuer changed the [d]eath [b]enefit with nothing calling 
attention to the change except language in a very long 
prospectus.”12 Ultimately, the arbitrator found that the 
customer claims were false and that VanWinkle had not been 
involved with the misconduct because the “fault lies with the 
issuer, not [VanWinkle], and none of the allegations raised 
involved actions by [VanWinkle].”13 The award seemingly 
acknowledges that VanWinkle either did not understand the 
product he sold or that he sold it to customers while 
misrepresenting its true nature. At best, the reasoning might 
support a finding that VanWinkle repeated the same innocent 
mistake at least twenty-four times. It does not establish that the 
customer complaints about him were false. 
The arbitrator’s ruling appears particularly puzzling 
because customers work with brokers to help them find 
financial products that are suitable for their situation.14 This 
requires that brokers like VanWinkle understand the products 
that they sell to customers and not simply push whatever 
 
 10. See VanWinkle, 2018 WL 4051277, at *1 (noting that the parties 
involved in the arbitration included VanWinkle and IFS Securities, a 
broker-dealer, but did not include the insurance company who issued the 
underlying annuity that was at issue in the case).  
 11. Id. at *2. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 2111 (2014) (obligating a broker to 
“have a reasonable basis to believe that a recommended transaction or 
investment strategy involving a security or securities is suitable for the 
customer”).  
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product pays the highest commission.15 The rules governing 
brokers make clear that a broker must have “an understanding 
of the potential risks and rewards associated with the 
recommended security or strategy” and that a broker who lacks 
“such an understanding when recommending a security or 
strategy violates the suitability rule.”16 The arbitrator’s factual 
finding about VanWinkle shows that he lacked that 
understanding. 
Many different stakeholders have an interest in these 
disputes and could have pointed out obvious problems with a 
broker selling dozens of customers the same variable annuity 
without understanding its terms. State regulators rely on public 
records to target their oversight and enforcement efforts. 
FINRA, which oversees brokers, would likely want to know this 
information when its staff examines a brokerage. Future 
investors would likely want to know about these complaints 
when deciding whether to hire him as a broker. And, 
presumably, the annuity’s issuer might want to point out that 
the broker and brokerage firm must understand the product it 
sells. But none of these stakeholders participated in the 
arbitration hearing.17 
The required final step of judicial confirmation of 
arbitration awards provides no real check on the process.18 Even 
when regulators have attempted to intervene at this stage, they 
have not generally succeeded at stopping confirmation. Courts 
routinely confirm these arbitration awards without any inquiry 
into whether the arbitrator made a reasonable decision.19 A 
 
 15. Cf. Ann Lipton, I Do Not Think It Means What You Think It Means, 
BUS. L. PROF BLOG (May 7, 2016), https://perma.cc/N9NV-7USX (describing 
variable annuities as “a product that might be suitable if you’re trying to 
shelter your assets from a lawsuit, but otherwise one whose chief virtue lies 
in its capacity to serve as a litmus test for the honesty of your broker”). 
 16. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 2111 Supplementary Material .05(a) 
(2014).  
 17. See VanWinkle v. IFS Sec., Inc., No. 17-02465, 2018 WL 4051277, at 
*1 (Aug. 13, 2018) (Ver Beek, Arb.) (listing participating parties). 
 18. See id. at *2 (noting that before arbitration awards may be enforced, 
they must be confirmed by courts of competent jurisdiction).  
 19. See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: 
Privatizing Law Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 711 (1999) 
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confirmed award allowed VanWinkle to have all this 
information deleted from public records.  
For decades, brokers and financial services industry firms 
have used private arbitration decisions to strip information 
from the public record.20 In theory, this expungement process 
provides an extraordinary remedy to protect financial 
professionals from having malicious, false, or entirely baseless 
complaints taint their records and harm their careers.21 In 
reality, significant evidence indicates that the expungement 
process actually suppresses important public information and 
tends to increase financial misconduct.22 This may happen 
either by allowing bad actors to remain or by emboldening 
others to take advantage of clients.23  
Brokers win expungements quite frequently. By one 
calculation, brokers have requested to expunge around 12 
percent of the allegations of misconduct made by customers and 
firms in recent years.24 Brokers making these requests 
generally succeed at suppressing information and win over 80 
percent of their requests.25 Notably, brokers who successfully 
 
(“Courts do not closely review arbitration awards to ensure that arbitrators 
apply the law. And even if a court discovers that an arbitration award does not 
apply the law, the court will likely confirm the award.”(citation omitted)). 
 20. See Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. 
L. REV. 785, 800 (2009) (noting that existing arbitration rules “facilitate the 
concealment of allegations of misconduct”). 
 21. See Colleen Honigsberg, The Case for Individual Audit Partner 
Accountability, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1914 (2019) (explaining that FINRA’s 
“BrokerCheck . . . database includes unverified customer complaints, 
prompting concerns that certain brokers are unfairly targeted”). 
 22. See Colleen Honigsberg & Matthew Jacob, Deleting Misconduct: The 
Expungement of BrokerCheck Records, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 1) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) 
[hereinafter Honigsberg & Jacob] (reporting that brokers with past history of 
successful expungements are more likely than brokers without past 
expungements to engage in future misconduct).  
 23. See id. at 5 (“Our analysis provides evidence that successful 
expungements increase recidivism.”). 
 24. See id. at 3 (explaining that evidence “suggests that brokers request 
to expunge 12% of the allegations of misconduct made by customers and firms” 
(citation omitted)). 
 25. See id. at 15 (“[O]ver 80% of expungements decided on the merits are 
successful in each year from 2007 to 2016 . . . .”). 
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expunge complaints from their record “are 3.3 times as likely to 
engage in new misconduct as the average broker.”26  
The finding that brokers who have secured expungements 
pose significantly more risk than the average broker raises real 
concerns about the legitimacy of the expungement process itself. 
Private arbitration proceedings may be particularly poorly 
suited to resolve questions of great public importance.27 If the 
expungement process reliably functioned to remove only false 
information, a broker who obtains an expungement award 
would not pose any special danger.28 Instead, the statistics 
emerging from the current expungement process reveal that the 
system likely purges truthful information, or at least 
information with significant predictive power. 
Many stakeholders have strong interests in knowing about 
a broker’s disclosures. The broker’s current and future investor 
clients have an interest in knowing about past customer 
disputes, as well as bankruptcies and convictions.29 Similarly, 
regulators have an interest in the information to effectively 
police their markets. Future employers also have an interest 
because a record of past disputes may help a firm decide 
whether a new hire will generate new liabilities. Yet the current 
expungement process only requires the participation of a broker 
and a brokerage firm.30 Regulators are able to participate at the 
confirmation stage, but rarely do. Customers whose disputes 
 
 26. Id. at 4. 
 27. Cf. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses 
Prevent Consumers from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. 
REV. 87, 127 (2012) (“[O]ur system often relies heavily and explicitly upon 
enforcement by private parties to achieve public regulatory objectives.”). 
 28. Theoretically, it might be possible that the brokers most likely to 
harm the public were also the most likely to draw false allegations. This seems 
highly unlikely. 
 29. See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Professional Prospectus: A Call for 
Effective Professional Disclosure, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1457, 1485 (2017) 
(“For market forces to function effectively, reputation must play a significant 
role. Yet reputation only plays a weak role in the current markets for 
professional services because public consumers both struggle to recognize and 
broadcast information about low quality professionals.”). 
 30. See infra Part II. 
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may have settled years ago may receive notice but have little 
incentive to participate.31 
 The current broker expungement process exemplifies 
“adversarial failure.” In using the phrase, I mean more than 
that the system simply does not work well. As Malcom Feeley 
has noted, adversarial systems can fail in ways analogous to 
market failures.32 Although writing in the criminal law context, 
he explains that although we “have theories and well-recognized 
institutions to prevent or correct for market failure—public 
finance theory, public utilities, regulatory agencies, and the 
like—we have no equivalent safeguards for adversarial 
failure.”33  
Adversarial failure may occur when parties to a dispute 
have either aligned interests or no real incentive to contest. 
Accustomed to adjudicating genuinely contested disputes, 
arbitrators and courts mistakenly expect that the lawyers and 
parties appearing before them will raise all relevant facts as 
well as applicable law and rules. They may also expect that, 
collectively, participating parties have some incentive to bring 
reasonably pertinent information to the adjudicator’s attention. 
Yet in many securities, shareholder, and mass tort disputes, the 
named parties have little incentive to generate a complete 
record.34 Sometimes, no party to an action has any real interest 
 
 31. For a description of the limited notice customers receive in many 
instances, see infra Part II.C.3 and accompanying text. 
 32. See Malcolm M. Feeley, How to Think About Criminal Court Reform, 
98 B.U. L. REV. 673, 704 (2018) (“Just as there is market failure at times, so 
too there can be adversarial system failure.”). 
 33. See id. (describing the criminal law system as using “some crude 
stop-gap measures, such as chronically underfunded public defender systems” 
to address the problem).  
 34. See ELIZABETH CHAMBLEE BURCH, MASS TORT DEALS: BACKROOM 
BARGAINING IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 107-09 (2019) (discussing how 
settlement deals may emerge without significant information ever reaching a 
court); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Publicly Funded Objectors, 19 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 47, 48–49 (2018) (“On paper, things run like 
clockwork. But practice suggests the need for tune-ups: some judges still 
approve settlements rife with red flags, and professional objectors may be 
more concerned with shaking down class counsel than with improving class 
members’ outcomes.” (citation omitted)). 
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in focusing a court’s attention on a significant issue.35 Seeing 
only what parties with aligned interests place before them, 
adversarial systems chug along—blind to the real picture. 
This Article connects with scholarly discussion in the 
shareholder derivative and securities class action settlement 
context. For the most part, scholars have highlighted problems 
in the context of class action settlement approvals.36 
Principal-agent problems often occur when lawyers 
representing named parties generally have interests which 
align in favor of settlement approval, often to the detriment of 
other key stakeholders and class members.37 Normal 
adversarial processes break down at this point because all of the 
parties actually involved desire the same result—approval of 
the settlement agreement.38 After agreeing to pay a set price to 
resolve all liability, defendants have no reason to pay lawyers to 
point out any defects in the settlement agreement or plan of 
distribution to the court. With significant fees on the table, 
 
 35. See Cathy Hwang & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Value of Uncertainty, 
110 NW. U. L. REV. 283, 284–85 (2015) (explaining that “despite the fact that 
some security holders may benefit from raising [a] jurisdictional issue and 
possibly having the case dismissed, courts and parties have generally not 
raised it” (citation omitted)). 
 36. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine 
v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1126 (1995) (explaining 
that in settlement approval hearings, “settling parties are aligned, and there 
may be no objector represented at the fairness hearing. These proceedings are 
thus analogous to ex parte proceedings, where a lawyer’s duty of candor to the 
court is much greater than in an ordinary adversarial proceeding”); Susan P. 
Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV. 1051, 
1057–68 (1996) (describing class counsel taking advantage of absent class 
members in class action settlements). 
 37. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s 
Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and 
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 46 (1991) [hereinafter 
Macey & Miller] (“[S]ettlement hearings are typically pep rallies jointly 
orchestrated by plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel. Because both parties 
desire that the settlement be approved, they have every incentive to present 
it as entirely fair.”). 
 38. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 893 (Del. Ch. 
2016) (“Once an agreement-in-principle is struck to settle for supplemental 
disclosures, the litigation takes on an entirely different, non-adversarial 
character. Both sides of the caption then share the same interest in obtaining 
the Court’s approval of the settlement.”); see also supra note 37 and 
accompanying text.  
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plaintiffs’ lawyers have little incentive to encourage a court to 
reduce their fees or carefully scrutinize how the agreement will 
affect all unrepresented and absent class members. In many 
instances, significant conflicts and flaws with a settlement deal 
may never be brought to a court’s attention.39 Yet little work 
connects these threads to similar problems within the financial 
regulatory system.  
  This Article explores how an adversarial system breaks 
down and fails to produce informed decisions in a way that hurts 
the public. It focuses on the process stockbrokers use to delete 
public information. It begins in Part II by developing a detailed 
case study about how brokers now leverage a private arbitration 
process to enlist courts in suppressing public access to 
information. Courts reviewing these arbitration awards 
actually exercise little oversight. The Federal Arbitration Act 
limits judicial review of arbitration awards, and only permits a 
court to vacate an arbitration award in rare circumstances.40 In 
essence, poorly informed arbitration decisions now drain 
important information from society without any real judicial or 
adversarial check.41 As with the problems in securities class 
actions, skewed incentives, underrepresentation, and conflicts 
amplify these recurring problems within the process for 
expunging customer dispute information about stockbrokers.  
Channeling disputes through arbitration proceedings only 
serves to amplify these problems—leaving courts as an 
ineffective check on arbitration outcomes.42 In contrast, 
 
 39. See Benjamin P. Edwards & Anthony Rickey, Uncovering the Hidden 
Conflicts in Securities Class Action Litigation: Lessons from the State Street 
Case, 75 BUS. LAW 1551, 1552–53 (2020) (“[A]dversarial review of settlements 
is rare, and no settling party has a reason to bring uncomfortable facts to the 
attention of a reviewing court.” (citation omitted)). 
 40. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2018) (setting out circumstances in which a court 
may vacate an arbitration award). 
 41. See Jean R. Sternlight, Hurrah for the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau: Consumer Arbitration as a Poster Child for Regulation, 48 ST. MARY’S 
L.J. 343, 345 (2016) (explaining that “regulation is desirable . . . when market 
forces are not sufficient to protect individual or public interests”). 
 42. Cf. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress 
Towards Justice in Employment Law: Where to, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. 
L. REV. 155, 159 (2019) (“If companies can continue to use mandatory 
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ordinary judicial dispute resolution systems create some 
restraint on adversarial failures. Public courts owe duties to the 
public to correctly state the law and consider how the precedent 
created will shape future cases.43 In contrast, private 
arbitrators often look no further than the materials submitted 
to them by the parties.44 
To its credit, FINRA has periodically responded to problems 
and imposed additional requirements.45 In 2017 it considered 
additional incremental reforms, including establishing a 
dedicated arbitrator pool for expungements, requiring 
unanimous approval from three arbitrators, imposing a 
one-year time period for seeking expungements, and other 
changes.46 In 2019, FINRA’s Board of Governors 
“approved . . . amendments to the Codes of Arbitration 
Procedure to create, among other things, a roster of 
arbitrators . . . to decide” expungement requests.47 Although 
these proposals have not yet been released, they will not solve 
the core problems which flow from bad incentives and 
conducting fact-finding through an arbitration process. At best, 
they may mitigate the ongoing harm to a degree. 
 
arbitration to eradicate access to court, where judges are potentially 
influenced by social movements, social movements will no longer be able to 
assist the overall progressive trend of our jurisprudence.”). 
 43. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Arbitration’s Dark Shadow, 18 NEV. L.J. 
427, 432 (2018) (“Arbitrators and judges adjudicate disputes in different ways. 
Precedent-creating judges owe a duty to the public to correctly state the law 
because court judgments are public acts by public officials. This means that 
judges will not simply regurgitate incorrect statements of law provided by the 
parties.” (citation omitted)). 
 44. FINRA’s training materials for arbitrators instruct that “[a]rbitrators 
should not make independent factual investigations of a case.” FIN. INDUS. 
REG. AUTH., FINRA DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES ARBITRATOR’S GUIDE 60 
(May 2020), https://perma.cc/5W3F-NKXU (PDF).  
 45. For a discussion of past problems with the process, see infra Part II.D 
and accompanying text. 
 46. See Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Reg. Notice 17-42, Expungement of 
Customer Dispute Information 5 (Dec. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/K8U4-Q2WU 
(PDF) (detailing updates to FINRA expungement rules and related arbitration 
proceedings).  
 47. Robert W. Cook, Update: FINRA Board of Governors Meeting, FIN. 
INDUS. REG. AUTH. (Oct. 3, 2019), https://perma.cc/3H3M-UUE8.  
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These failures reveal the need for a range of interventions 
to produce better informed decisions. Part III considers some 
possibilities. It proposes shifting resolution of these issues to a 
non-adversarial and more regulatory process. Adjudicators 
might also mitigate adversarial failures by adopting a more 
skeptical approach or recruiting assistance when parties lack 
incentives to develop and present important information. If an 
adversarial system must be used, it also explores necessary 
changes to the dominant ethical framework for lawyers 
presenting information to decision makers. The American Bar 
Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides the 
framework and operative text for most state professional ethics 
rules.48 Although Model Rule 3.3 generally calls for lawyers to 
be candid with tribunals, the rules grant lawyers substantial 
leeway to shape the factual scenarios adjudicators actually 
see.49 Changes to attorney ethics rules might cause lawyers to 
present more balanced pictures. 
II. Expungement and Adversarial Failure 
For decades, brokers have been able to leverage arbitration 
proceedings to remove customer complaints from readily 
accessible public records.50 Brokers have long supported the 
process because it gives them a path to challenge unverified 
customer complaints. Yet the process does not sufficiently 
protect the public’s interest in information. One arbitrator 
generally criticized the way most expungements occur, pointing 
out that many arbitration awards recommending expungement 
“are not much more than conclusory reiterations of the findings 
and not careful discussions and analyses of the evidence.”51 
Ultimately, the arbitrator recognized that many “decisions 
suggest that the panel did little more than have a mini ex-parte 
 
 48. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).  
 49. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) 
(allowing lawyers to present information they suspect may be false or 
incomplete).  
 50. For an explanation of FINRA’s role, see infra Part II.D.  
 51. Gilliam v. Sagepoint Fin., Inc., No. 12-03717, 2013 WL 3963949, at 
*3 (July 22, 2013) (Meyer, Arb.). 
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trial on the merits,” resulting in expungements.52 State 
regulators have also panned this expungement process as “a 
failed system.”53 This case study details the broad context and 
history surrounding the expungement process before examining 
the many reasons why this adversarial expungement process 
fails to generate informed or reliable decisions. At root, much of 
the harm flows from the reality that this arbitration-facilitated 
expungement system most substantively resembles an ex parte 
proceeding cloaked in the form of an ordinary, adversarial 
arbitration. In the end, the system now functions so poorly that 
brokers receiving expungements pose over three times as much 
danger to the public on a statistical basis than the average 
broker.54 
Importantly, arbitration-facilitated expungements only 
partially erase and blur history. Those in the know may find 
expungement awards buried in FINRA’s database of publicly 
available arbitration awards.55 Although it is not possible to 
reconstruct all expunged information, informed observers can 
identify brokers who have had customer dispute information 
deleted. Some informed observers may still take the fact of prior 
expungements into account. Yet most ordinary regulatory, 
arbitral, and judicial processes will not. After all, a court does 
confirm an award before the customer dispute information is 
actually deleted.56 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Letter from Christopher Gerold, N. Am. Sec. Admins. Ass’n 
President, to Vanessa Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 3 (Mar. 
18, 2020) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 54. See Honigsberg & Jacob, supra note 22, at 4 (finding that brokers with 
expungements pose significantly greater risks than the average broker). 
 55. See Nicole G. Iannarone, Finding Light in Arbitration’s Dark 
Shadow, 4 NEV. L.J.F. 1, 7 (2020)  (“In the process of removing all information 
concerning the customer’s dispute from her CRD, the broker asserts a claim 
for expungement in the FINRA arbitration forum, the result of which is then 
recorded as an award and publicly available . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 56. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
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A. The Broad Context 
When Americans need help allocating funds and saving for 
retirement, they often turn to financial advisors for assistance.57 
These advisors operate within a variety of regulatory structures 
and may owe different duties depending on the particular 
capacity in which they operate at any time.58 And many brokers 
operate in a dual capacity, sometimes acting as a fiduciary 
investment adviser and a salesperson with the same customer. 
The actual standards for investment advice continue to evolve, 
and many financial advisors provide advice subject to 
significant conflicts which often skew their advice toward more 
expensive and underperforming options.59 A financial advisor’s 
prospective clients need accurate information to screen advisors 
to protect themselves from conflicts of interest. Existing clients 
need this information to determine whether to stay with a 
broker or whether to investigate products the broker may have 
previously sold them. This case study focuses on 
brokers— commission-compensated salespeople affiliated with 
brokerage firms. Although many of these brokers wear multiple 
 
 57. See Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 181, 213 (2017) (explaining that different “types of financial advisors now 
play a major role in dispensing personalized investment advice and 
influencing retail capital allocation”). 
 58. See Christine Lazaro & Benjamin P. Edwards, The Fragmented 
Regulation of Investment Advice: A Call for Harmonization, 4 MICH. BUS. & 
ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 47 (2014), and Benjamin P. Edwards, Fiduciary 
Duty and Investment Advice: Will a Uniform Fiduciary Duty Make a Material 
Difference?, 14 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 105 (2014), for discussions of the divergent 
standards governing financial advisors. Some have begun to turn to 
automated investment advice platforms known as “roboadvisers” for 
assistance. See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Rise of Automated Investment 
Advice: Can Robo-Advisers Rescue the Retail Market?, 93 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
97, 98 (2018) (“Consumer interest in automated investment advice continues 
to grow.”). 
 59. One well-known bias is toward recommending higher-fee, actively 
managed mutual funds. See Jacob Hale Russell, The Separation of Intelligence 
and Control: Retirement Savings and the Limits of Soft Paternalism, 6 WM. & 
MARY BUS. L. REV. 35, 59 n.102 (2015) (likening the debate over active versus 
passive investing to the debate over climate change because the debate 
persists even though the relative underperformance of active management has 
been conclusively established for decades). 
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hats and also operate within other capacities, this case study 
focuses on them as brokers. 
Clients often struggle to monitor their broker’s performance 
because of life cycle, behavioral, and innumeracy-related 
reasons. Many Americans turn to financial advisers for 
assistance at a time when they may be less capable of protecting 
their own interests than ever before. Most ordinary savers 
accumulate retirement savings within some 
defined-contribution pension, such as a 401(k). Many savers 
also have individual retirement accounts or taxable brokerage 
accounts. As a saver approaches and enters retirement, she 
faces an ever-increasing risk of cognitive decline.60 In this 
context, retiring savers stand to suffer enormous losses if they 
entrust their assets to an unfaithful or inept manager. 
Detecting mismanagement or exploitation may be especially 
challenging for many Americans because Americans, as a whole, 
exhibit low levels of basic financial literacy.61 Despite this, 
America’s securities law regime assumes that Americans will be 
able to make sense of our disclosure-based regime for financial 
products.62 In reality, Americans generally struggle to 
understand financial products and the obligations financial 
services professionals actually owe to them.63  
The regulatory framework also aims to protect Americans 
through significant oversight of industry actors. The federal 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) possesses broad 
 
 60. See ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, 2020 REPORT, ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE FACTS AND 
FIGURES REPORT 18 (2020), https://perma.cc/DM6M-MQDZ (PDF) (explaining 
that that 10 percent of persons over 65, and 32 percent of persons over 85, 
suffer from dementia). 
 61. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY REGARDING FINANCIAL LITERACY 
AMONG INVESTORS iii (2012), https://perma.cc/C6WZ-3SYQ (PDF) [hereinafter 
SEC FINANCIAL LITERACY STUDY] (documenting extensively widespread 
financial illiteracy). 
 62. See Lisa M. Fairfax, The Securities Law Implications of Financial 
Illiteracy, 104 VA. L. REV. 1065, 1069 (2018) (“[T]he federal securities law 
regime is inextricably linked to financial literacy because the regime presumes 
investors have the capacity to sufficiently understand the information being 
disclosed to them and thus the capacity to make suitable investment choices 
for themselves.”). 
 63. See Edwards, supra note 29, at 1462 (discussing “information 
asymmetry between professional service providers and the public”). 
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jurisdiction over the securities markets.64 It also delegates 
authority to FINRA, which “oversee[s] more than 634,000 
brokers across the country,” and focuses on “protecting investors 
and safeguarding market integrity in a manner that facilitates 
vibrant capital markets.” 65 
FINRA plays a unique role and bridges the gap between 
business and government. As a financial self-regulatory 
organization, FINRA operates with significant oversight from 
the SEC.66  It funds its own operations, primarily from member 
dues.67 Its members consist of broker-dealer firms—the same 
entities it regulates.68  
FINRA also maintains a dispute resolution forum which 
captures nearly all brokerage industry disputes. When disputes 
between investors and brokers arise, mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements channel nearly all of those disputes into 
FINRA’s dispute resolution forum.69 FINRA remains responsive 
to stakeholder concerns and has changed the rules governing its 
arbitration process to address many of those concerns.70 
 
 64. See FINRA, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc/2QAA-8Q8E 
(explaining that FINRA “work[s] under the supervision of the SEC”).   
 65. FINRA was formerly known as the National Association of Securities 
Dealers. FINRA describes itself as a “government-authorized not-for-profit 
organization that oversees U.S. broker-dealers.” About FINRA, FIN. INDUS. 
REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc/V2M2-BW47.  
 66. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2018) (prescribing the regulations for 
“registered securities associations”).  
 67. See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming A Fifth 
Branch, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 20 n.101 (2013) (describing FINRA’s funding). 
 68. See Andrew Stoltmann & Benjamin P. Edwards, FINRA Governance 
Review: Public Governors Should Protect the Public Interest, 24 PIABA B.J. 
369, 370 (2017) (describing FINRA’s governance structure).  
 69. See Jill Gross, The Historical Basis of Securities Arbitration as an 
Investor Protection Mechanism, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 171, 171–72 (2016) 
(“Today, in fact, most disputes between customers of broker-dealer firms and 
the firms and their associated persons must be arbitrated through FINRA 
Dispute Resolution . . . .”). 
 70. One 2008 study found investors were mostly dissatisfied with their 
experience in the FINRA arbitration forum. See Jill I. Gross & Barbara Black, 
When Perception Changes Reality: An Empirical Study of Investors’ Views of 
the Fairness of Securities Arbitration, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 349, 386 (2008) 
(“An overwhelming 71% of customers disagreed with the positive statement 
that ‘I am satisfied with the outcome,’ and only 22% of customers agreed with 
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B. BrokerCheck and the Underlying CRD Database 
Investors and regulators may learn about complaints other 
investors have lodged against brokers by reviewing information 
about a broker on BrokerCheck, a website operated by FINRA.71 
BrokerCheck explains that it “is a free tool to research the 
background and experience of financial brokers, advisers and 
firms.”72  
Yet this tool has real limits.73 Information available on 
BrokerCheck comes from the Central Registration Depository 
(CRD) and the Investment Adviser Registration Depository 
(IARD), databases operated by FINRA and jointly owned by the 
states.74 The North American Securities Administrators 
Association (NASAA) and FINRA developed the CRD to 
consolidate regulatory processes.75 It “contains the licensing and 
disciplinary histories on more than 630,000 securities 
professionals.”76 Much of this information enters the database 
when brokers file their licensing forms. NASAA has long held 
that CRD records are state records because state regulations 
direct brokerages to file forms with the CRD to register their 
 
that statement.”); see also Teresa J. Verges, Evolution of the Arbitration 
Forum as a Response to Mandatory Arbitration, 18 NEV. L.J. 437, 439 (2018) 
(“FINRA has made significant changes to its arbitration rules governing 
customer disputes to better serve investors.”). 
 71. See BrokerCheck by FINRA, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc
/KRN3-245G (noting that BrokerCheck is operated and controlled by FINRA).  
 72. Id. 
 73. See Susan Antilla, The Unbelievable Story of One Broker and Her 
Firm Fighting to Clean Her Tarnished Record, THE STREET (June 21, 2016, 
11:14 AM), https://perma.cc/W7DH-8DB4 (“[A]nyone who does business with 
a securities firm would be insane to assume that the stuff they read on Finra’s 
online BrokerCheck tells the whole story.”). 
 74. See CRD & IARD Resources, N. AM. SECS. ADMINS. ASS’N, https://
perma.cc/2HCM-DN4G (providing informational resources regarding the CRD 
and IARD).  
 75. See CRD at a Glance, N. AM. SECS. ADMINS. ASS’N, https://perma.cc
/TG43-LTQD (“Developed by NASAA and NASD (now FINRA) and 
implemented in 1981, CRD consolidated a multiple paper-based state 
licensing and regulatory process into a single, nationwide computer system.”). 
 76. Id. 
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associated persons.77 Courts also recognize that the CRD data 
is “‘the joint property of the applicant, [FINRA], and those CRD 
[s]tates.’”78 State public records laws generally apply to 
information contained in the CRD database.79 
The Exchange Act requires that some information from the 
CRD database be freely available to the public and grants 
FINRA discretion to decide the “type, scope, and presentation of 
information to be provided” to the public.80 FINRA exercises 
discretion to curate BrokerCheck disclosures down to reveal 
only a portion of the information contained in the full CRD. This 
sanitization has drawn some criticism for obscuring too much 
information.81  
Investors need access to information about brokers to 
protect themselves.82 FINRA recognizes that customer 
complaint disclosures are useful in predicting future 
 
 77. See Letter from Joseph Borg, N. Am. Secs. Admins. Ass’n President, 
to Barbara Sweeney, Sec’y Nat. Ass’n Secs. Dealers Regulation, Inc. (Dec. 31, 
2001) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 78. E.g., Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876, 885 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2008) 
(quoting CRD Agreement Amendment) (emphasis in original removed) 
(alteration in original). 
 79. See Advisory Legal Opinion from Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney 
Gen. of Fla. to Robert F. Milligan, Comptroller of Fla. (Aug. 28, 1998) 
(“[A]pplication and disciplinary reports maintained by the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Central Registration Depository that are 
used by the Department of Banking and Finance in licensing and regulating 
securities dealers doing business in this state do constitute public 
records . . . .”). 
 80. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(i)(1)(C) (2018). 
 81. The Public Investors Advocate Bar Association (PIABA), criticized 
FINRA in 2014 and in 2016 for providing limited information. See JASON R. 
DOSS, CHRISTINE LAZARO, & BENJAMIN P. EDWARDS, THE INEQUALITY OF 
INVESTOR ACCESS TO INFORMATION (Mar. 6, 2014), https://perma.cc/VSQ4-9L4T 
(PDF); see also HUGH D. BERKSON & MARNIE C. LAMBERT, BROKERCHECK—THE 
INEQUALITY OF INVESTOR ACCESS TO INFORMATION REMAINS UNABATED—AN 
UPDATE TO PIABA’S MARCH 2014 REPORT 26 (2016), https://perma.cc/BC3H-
K4CP (PDF). 
 82. See Order Granting Accelerated Approval to Filing Related to 
Changes to Forms U4, U5, and FINRA Rule 8312 No. 34–59916, 74 Fed. Reg. 
23,750, 23,754 (May 20, 2009) (explaining that investors entrust brokers “with 
their savings and should have sufficient pertinent information available to 
enable them to select a registered representative with whose background they 
are comfortable”). 
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misconduct.83 One study by FINRA staff found “that 
BrokerCheck information, including disciplinary records, 
financial disclosures, and employment history of brokers has 
significant power to predict investor harm.”84 Since investors 
cannot get complete information from BrokerCheck, the SEC 
also encourages investors to seek information from state 
regulators.85  
Expungement processes—discussed in greater detail in the 
next subpart—remove information from the CRD database and, 
consequently, it also disappears from the more broadly known 
and accessible BrokerCheck website.86 Importantly, this record 
suppression likely harms even those public investors who would 
have never personally conducted due diligence. Industry firms 
may hire brokers without knowledge of past problems. Even if 
they do become aware of past expungements, they have no way 
to know the true merits of any past expunged complaint. In the 
same way, deletion also inhibits regulators’ ability to protect the 
public.87  
Ultimately, a well-functioning expungement process must 
balance appropriate, competing interests. Although brokers will 
generally prefer to minimize unflattering information about 
themselves, they have a legitimate interest in removing 
provably false and defamatory claims. But this interest must be 
 
 83. See Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule 
Change to Amend FINRA Rule 8312 to Allow the Dissemination of IAPD 
Information Through BrokerCheck No. 34–62468, 85 Fed. Reg. 26,502, 26,505 
(May 4, 2020) (explaining that an inclusion of customer complaints in the CRD 
system can help “increas[e] the ability of users to understand the potential 
risk of misconduct” on the part of their brokers). 
 84. HAMMAD QURESHI & JONATHAN SOKOBIN, DO INVESTORS HAVE 
VALUABLE INFORMATION ABOUT BROKERS? 1 (2015), https://perma.cc/S8QA-
VEHC (PDF). 
 85. See Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change to Amend FINRA Rule 
8312 (FINRA BrokerCheck Disclosure), 75 Fed. Reg. 41,254, 41,258 (July 15, 
2010) (“The Commission urges the public to utilize all sources of information, 
particularly the databases of the state regulators . . . .”). 
 86. See infra Part II.C. 
 87. See Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Reg. Notice 14-31 Expungement of 
Customer Dispute Information 2 (July 30, 2014) https://perma.cc/49B7-UGZ2 
(PDF) (“Once information is expunged from the CRD system, it is permanently 
deleted and, therefore, no longer available to the investing public or 
regulators.”). 
  
ADVERSARIAL FAILURE  1073 
 
balanced against the need for regulators to have access to past 
complaints and for diligent investors to be able to gather 
information before turning their life savings over to a broker. 
The current process has drawn criticism for improperly 
balancing these interests and broadly facilitating the removal of 
information.88 
C. Expungement Incentives and Process 
Expungement processes have evolved substantially over 
the years. After the CRD’s creation in 1981, FINRA would delete 
information from the database after either an arbitration award 
or a court decision called for it.89 FINRA instituted a 
moratorium on arbitrator-ordered expungements in 1999 after 
state regulators expressed concern about the removal of 
information from the CRD database that regulators contended 
were state records without any court order directing removal.90 
 
 88. A study by the PIABA Foundation found that FINRA’s “current 
expungement process fails to properly balance the interests of investors, 
regulators, and the public in the CRD maintaining complete and accurate 
information about brokers against the interest of brokers in protecting their 
reputations from false customer complaints.” JASON R. DOSS & LISA BRAGANÇA, 
2019 STUDY ON FINRA EXPUNGEMENTS: A SERIOUSLY FLAWED PROCESS THAT 
SHOULD BE STOPPED IMMEDIATELY TO PROTECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE PUBLIC 
RECORD 7 (2019), https://perma.cc/9FSY-GJ6F (PDF).  
 89. See Nat. Ass’n Secs. Dealers, Notice to Members 01-65 Request for 
Comment on Proposed Rules Relating to Expungement from the CRD 563 
(Oct. 2001), https://perma.cc/CK26-BFZB (PDF) (requesting comment on 
changing procedures). 
 90. See Nat. Ass’n Secs. Dealers, Notice to Members 99-09 Moratorium 
on Arbitrator-Ordered Expungements from the CRD 47 (Feb. 1999), https://
perma.cc/7FDZ-8569 (PDF) 
NASD Regulation has taken the position that expungement of 
information from the CRD system that is ordered by an arbitrator 
and contained in an award should be afforded the same treatment 
as a court-ordered expungement. NASAA disagrees with this 
position and has informed NASD Regulation that it does not believe 
that arbitrator-ordered expungements should be afforded the same 
treatment as court-ordered expungements. 
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To resolve the issue, FINRA created a new process, now 
codified under Rule 2080.91 Under Rule 2080, brokers can 
pursue relief two different ways, either by going directly to court 
or by having a court confirm an arbitration award which 
recommends expungement.92 Rule 2080 requires brokers 
seeking judicial assistance with an expungement to “name 
FINRA as an additional party and serve FINRA with all 
appropriate documents unless this requirement is waived.”93 
FINRA may waive the requirement to name it as a party if the 
underlying customer claim is: (i) “factually impossible or clearly 
erroneous;” (ii) the broker had no involvement in the conduct; or 
(iii) the “claim, allegation or information is false.”94 FINRA also 
reserves the right to waive the requirement to name it as a party 
under “extraordinary circumstances.”95 
When the SEC approved Rule 2080, it also contained the 
requirement to name FINRA as a party to the court action 
unless FINRA opted to waive the requirement.96 The SEC 
approved the framework because it believed “that the potential 
involvement of [FINRA] at the court confirmation level will 
provide greater safeguards than simple application of the rule 
to members.”97 As conceived, the system aimed “to shift final 
authority on expungement away from arbitrators, and to courts 
of law.”98  
 
 91. See Seth E. Lipner, The Expungement of Customer Complaint CRD 
Information Following the Settlement of a FINRA Arbitration, 19 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 57, 68–76 (2013) (tracing the early history of FINRA Rule 
2080). 
 92. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 2080 (2009) (“Obtaining an Order 
of Expungement of Customer Dispute Information from the Central 
Registration Depository (CRD) System.”).  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. The SEC first approved a nearly identical, earlier iteration of Rule 
2080 issued by the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). 
 97. Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Change 
Relating to Proposed NASD Rule 2130 Concerning the Expungement of 
Customer Dispute Information from the Central Registration Depository 
System No. 34–48933, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,667, 74,671 (Dec. 24, 2003). 
 98. Reinking v. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., No. A-11-CA-813-SS, 2011 WL 
13113323, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2011). 
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 Yet courts of law are not well-situated to constrain 
expungements. A court may only vacate an arbitration award in 
rare circumstances.99 Both federal statutory law and precedent 
leave courts unable to conduct any significant review of an 
arbitrator’s decision absent rare circumstances.100 Absent some 
indication that the arbitrator was biased or otherwise refused to 
listen to evidence, it remains extraordinarily difficult to prevent 
an arbitration award from being confirmed in a court hearing. 
Courts simply do not get into the weeds when reviewing 
arbitration awards. Absent extraordinary circumstances, they 
simply confirm them.101 
Now, most expungement hearings proceed under a mix of 
official FINRA rules, guidance, and arbitrator training 
materials. Because the critical fact-centric expungement 
hearings occur within an arbitration forum, the public has little 
or no access to information about the hearings.102 Only in the 
rarest circumstances will a court review the evidence considered 
by an arbitrator before confirming an arbitration award. 
Although most brokers pursue expungements through the 
FINRA arbitration process before having a court confirm the 
award, a few still attempt to go directly to court proceedings.103 
Courts divide over whether and how to consider these 
direct-to-court filings. Some courts evaluating these requests 
 
 99. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2018) (setting out circumstances where a court may 
vacate an arbitration award). 
 100. See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008) (“We now 
hold that §§ 10 and 11 respectively provide the FAA’s exclusive grounds for 
expedited vacatur and modification.”). 
 101. See, e.g., Walker v. Connelly, No. 100681/08, 2008 WL 4754138, at *7 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 2008) (confirming arbitration award over opposition).  
 102. Notably, FINRA itself is not subject to the Freedom of Information 
Act because it is not a government agency. A quirk in the law also exempts 
information about the SEC’s oversight of FINRA from disclosure. See Pub. 
Invs. Arbitration Bar Ass’n v. U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 930 F. Supp. 2d 55, 
72– 73 (D.D.C. 2013), aff’d, 771 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[A]ll records relating 
to the SEC’s examination reports—including reports relating to the 
administrative functions of FINRA—are exempt from disclosure under the 
FOIA.”). 
 103. See In re Lickiss, No. C-11-1986 EMC, 2011 WL 2471022, at *2 (N.D. 
Cal. June 22, 2011) (“[A]s FINRA conceded at the oral argument herein, its 
rules do not require a member or associated person to first present a request 
to expunge to FINRA before going to court under Rule 2080(a).”). 
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have sought to weigh the equities, balancing the public’s rights 
against the broker’s interest to reach a decision.104 Others have 
declined jurisdiction on the theory that the broker already has 
a remedy through the FINRA arbitration process.105 
1. Incentives 
Understanding how the arbitration-facilitated 
expungement process operates requires a sense about how 
different incentives influence actors who participate within the 
arbitration forum. These fundamental incentive problems bias 
the expungement process toward facilitating the removal of 
information from public records.  
a. Customers Have No Real Incentive to Participate  
At the outset, it has long been clear that customers have 
little incentive to oppose a broker’s request to expunge 
information from public records.106 Harmed customers have no 
need to ensure that public information about the broker is 
accurate once they have settled or otherwise resolved their 
dispute. These customers already know to avoid the broker who 
 
 104. See Lickiss v. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 173, 180 (2012) 
(instructing lower court to consider the equities in evaluating an expungement 
request); see also Reinking, 2011 WL 13113323, at *2 (“[T]he Court finds (1) it 
has the power to expunge a CRD record, and (2) the correct guiding standard 
should be whether the disputed record has any regulatory value . . . .”). 
 105. See Aiguier v. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., No. SUCV201602491BLS1, 
2017 WL 1336579, at *6–7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 11, 2017) (declining equity 
jurisdiction over FINRA because it would “circumvent the arbitration 
provisions that govern the resolution of claims that the plaintiff asserts 
against NYLife. Accordingly, this court holds that it does not have jurisdiction 
in equity to consider the plaintiff’s claim for expungement.”). 
 106. See Letter from Karen Tyler, N. Am. Secs. Admins. Ass’n President 
and N.D. Sec. Comm’r, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, Sec. Exch. Comm’n (Apr. 24, 
2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) (“[T]he claimant and 
their counsel have no incentive to participate in the expungement hearing. 
Quite the opposite is true. Claimants would incur additional costs, in the way 
of attorney’s fees and time, in order to participate and would gain no benefit 
through their participation.”). 
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swindled them. Unsurprisingly, customers rarely appear to 
contest a broker’s request for expungement.107 
At best, harmed customers may feel they have some civic 
duty to protect the information if they understand the broader 
systemic ramifications of a broker’s attempt to expunge 
information. Yet aside from the dry pleasure of protecting the 
integrity of public information, customers receive no real 
benefits by opposing a broker’s expungement request.  
Consider a customer’s financial interests. One court 
recognized that “customers have no financial interest in the 
outcome of [expungement] claims the plaintiff asserts in the 
[c]omplaint and may well be disinterested in whether 
BrokerCheck reports their complaints against him or not.”108 
Customers do not receive any additional compensation if they 
successfully oppose a broker’s expungement request. In most 
instances, customers will need the assistance of a lawyer to 
mount any reasonable opposition to an expungement 
request— and they should not be compelled to defend an 
action.109 Few lawyers will assist customers and oppose 
expungements on a pro bono basis. Even if the customer could 
find pro bono assistance, many would likely prefer to spend their 
time doing other things than participating in arbitration 
hearings where they will likely be called a liar. 
Customers face little downside from spending their time on 
more enjoyable activities. While customers may theoretically 
face reputational risk if arbitrators deem their complaint “false” 
and recommend that it be expunged, this will likely have no 
real-world effect on them. When the customers are not parties 
 
 107. One study of over one thousand expungement awards found that 
customers appeared only 13 percent of the time. See DOSS & BRAGANÇA, supra 
note 88, at 4. 
 108. Aiguier v. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Inc., No. 16-02491, 2017 WL 
1311986, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2017). 
 109. See id.  
[T]he court has grave concerns about naming a person as a 
defendant in a case in which no claim is asserted against him/her, 
thereby putting that person to the potential expense of retaining 
counsel to explain the nature of the proceeding and what if anything 
he/she must do in response to being served with a summons and 
complaint. 
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to the arbitration, the expungement awards do not ordinarily 
even identify them by name.110 
b. Weak Claimant Attorney Incentives 
While the customer receives notice of the expungement 
hearing, the attorney who represented that customer can only 
learn of the expungement proceeding if the customer tells her. 
Even when the attorney learns about a hearing, the attorneys 
who regularly represent claimants in FINRA arbitration also 
have little incentive to convince clients to aggressively oppose 
expungement attempts. Most claimant attorneys take cases on 
a contingency basis. Representing a client at an expungement 
hearing usually requires a substantial amount of time and 
preparation. After expending this effort, the claimant’s attorney 
will not recover any funds if she successfully opposes an 
expungement. Very few customers are willing to pay an attorney 
fees to oppose an expungement request. 
Still, claimants’ attorneys may have some incentive to 
oppose expungements because they operate as repeat players in 
FINRA arbitrations. A string of expungement awards finding 
that they file “false” claims may hurt their reputations. They 
may also have an interest in preserving information about past 
claims to assist future clients. A claimant’s attorney may desire 
to ask a broker about past complaints or use the information in 
the CRD database to identify possible additional witnesses who 
could testify about a broker’s behavior. 
Ultimately, claimant attorneys who learn of an 
expungement proceeding may hesitate to devote significant 
resources to opposing the expungement request. Although 
preserving information may benefit future clients, the 
claimants’ bar is not monolithic. A lawyer who expends 
resources to protect information from expungement may never 
be positioned to use the information in a later arbitration 
hearing because some other lawyer may represent future clients 
who were harmed by the particular broker. In contrast, the 
 
 110. See, e.g. Loris v. Sec. Am., Inc., No. 19-02661, 2020 WL 2494752, at 
*1 (May 7, 2020) (Thompson, Arb.) (“[C]ustomer in Occurrence Number 
1933223 (the ‘Customer’) was served with the [s]tatement of [c]laim.”). 
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broker or brokerage firm will almost certainly benefit from 
removing the information from the public record. 
Securities arbitration clinics affiliated with law schools may 
contain the only claimant attorneys with a real incentive to 
oppose broker requests for expungement.111 An expungement 
hearing may provide an opportunity for a law student to both 
protect the public and gain practical experience. Regrettably, 
only about a dozen securities clinics exist and they rarely appear 
in expungement hearings because the hearings may happen on 
relatively short notice, making it difficult for clients to find the 
pro bono clinics and for students to prepare. 
c. Brokers Have Strong Incentives to Seek Expungement 
In contrast, brokers have strong incentives to seek 
expungements. We know that brokers place substantial value 
on expunging unflattering information because they regularly 
pay lawyers to secure expungements. Public customer 
complaints likely inhibit a broker’s ability to drum up new 
business and continue to make money. Customers who do 
review a broker’s record may pause if they see that other 
investors have raised complaints. 
Brokers may also seek expungement to reduce regulatory 
pressure and scrutiny. FINRA’s enforcement process now 
prioritizes “high risk” brokers and imposes its harshest 
penalties on repeat offenders.112 In particular, FINRA now 
focuses special oversight on “high-risk brokers.”113 Although it 
does not disclose the precise method it uses to identify high-risk 
brokers, FINRA has disclosed that its criteria include 
settlements, customer complaints, disclosures, and proximity to 
 
 111. See Jill Gross, The Improbable Birth and Conceivable Death of the 
Securities Arbitration Clinic, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 597, 600 (2014) 
(describing securities arbitration clinics). 
 112. See Honigsberg & Jacob, supra note 22, at 4 (explaining that the 
FINRA disciplinary regime “imposes increasingly severe sanctions on repeat 
offenders”). 
 113. See Melanie Waddell, Here’s How FINRA Defines a ‘High-Risk’ 
Broker, THINK ADVISOR (May 23, 2018, 2:02 PM), https://perma.cc/L8G8-BKQF 
(describing FINRA’s assessment mechanisms to determine if a broker is 
high-risk). 
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other high-risk brokers.114 The expungement process offers a 
method to purge many of the identifying factors from a broker’s 
record and possibly allow her to sink beneath the radar.115 If 
higher-risk brokers use the expungement process to avoid 
scrutiny, it would explain one finding that brokers who have 
received “expungements are 3.3 times as likely to engage in new 
misconduct as the average broker.”116 
Negative information in a broker’s CRD creates real risk for 
a broker facing a FINRA enforcement action. FINRA’s guidance 
for sanctions instructs adjudicators to look for a pattern when 
reviewing a broker’s record.117 FINRA’s guidance explains that 
adjudicators considering arbitration awards or settlements 
“should rely on the CRD description of the amount of the award 
or settlement.”118 Within the disciplinary proceeding at least, 
“parties are precluded from challenging the arbitration award 
or contesting the CRD description of arbitration settlements.”119 
Expunging information from the CRD may reduce the broker’s 
exposure to recidivism-related enhancements in disciplinary 
sanctions.120 
Brokers may also pursue expungements because a clean 
record may help a broker remain at higher-tier industry firms. 
Remaining affiliated with a marquee firm grants status and 
often greater access to more profitable high net-worth 
 
 114. See id. (stating that FINRA looks at a broker’s “settlements, 
complaints, disclosures, employment history/termination history, exam 
attempts, geography . . . [and] individuals who associate with high-risk 
brokers”).  
 115. Although it has not disclosed that it does so, FINRA might keep a log 
of brokers with expungements for use in identifying higher risk brokers. 
 116. Honigsberg & Jacob, supra note 22, at 4. 
 117. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., FINRA SANCTION GUIDELINES 3 (Mar. 
2019), https://perma.cc/8K49-LYZY (PDF) (“Adjudicators should draw on their 
experience and judgment when evaluating if a respondent’s [d]isciplinary and 
[a]rbitration [h]istory establishes a pattern.”).  
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Honigsberg & Jacob, supra note 22, at 4 (“[I]f brokers are abusing 
the expungement process, . . . removing misconduct from BrokerCheck 
will . . . hamper the effectiveness of FINRA’s disciplinary regime, which 
imposes increasingly severe sanctions on repeat offenders.”).  
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investors.121 One recent economics paper found that brokers 
with records of misconduct tend to migrate from higher-tier to 
lower-tier industry firms.122 Higher-tier brokerage firms 
seemingly care more about their reputations and keep discipline 
by deciding not to employ brokers with misconduct records.123 
In essence, a broker may be able to enhance her chances of 
staying at or migrating to a higher-tier firm by securing an 
expungement. 
d. Brokerage Firms Have Little Incentive to Oppose 
In expungement-only cases, brokers seeking expungements 
often name their current or former employers as respondents.124 
Importantly, brokerage firms have little incentive to oppose a 
broker’s expungement request and may actually benefit if the 
broker secures an expungement.125 One recent study of over a 
thousand arbitration awards involving expungements found 
that brokerage firms “did not object or otherwise oppose the 
individual broker’s expungement request . . . over 98% of the 
time.”126 
Brokerage firms typically benefit when their current and 
former brokers secure expungements because it lowers their 
 
 121. See Mark Egan, Gregor Matvos & Amit Seru, The Market for 
Financial Adviser Misconduct, 127 J. POL. ECON. 233, 275 (2019) 
(“[D]efrauding large investors may be more profitable, since they have more 
wealth.”). 
 122. See id. at 237 (explaining that the firms that hire brokers with 
misconduct records “are less desirable and offer lower compensation”). 
 123. See id. at 236 (“Firms, wanting to protect their reputation for honest 
dealing, would fire advisers who engage in misconduct. Other firms would 
have the same reputation concerns and would not hire such advisers.”).  
 124. See Notice to Arbitrators and Parties on Expanded Expungement 
Guidance, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc/VC8L-5YEV (last updated 
Sept. 2017) (“In some instances, an associated person will file an arbitration 
claim against a member firm solely for the purpose of seeking expungement, 
without naming the customer in the underlying dispute as a respondent.”).  
 125. See Lisa Bragança & Jason Doss, How Expungement-Only Cases Are 
“Gamed, Exploited and Abused” by Brokers, FIN. PLAN. (Oct. 29, 2019, 11:48 
AM), https://perma.cc/RH4T-EH58 (“Since brokers and their brokerage firms 
both have an interest in erasing customer complaints from the brokers’ 
records, they are rarely in opposition to each other.”). 
 126. Id. 
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regulatory profile and reduces their reputation and litigation 
risks.127 FINRA imposes additional obligations on firms 
employing brokers with “a recent history of customer 
complaints, disciplinary actions involving sales practice abuse 
or other customer harm, or adverse arbitration decisions.”128 
Implementing heightened supervisory procedures for brokers 
with checkered pasts costs firms money and may expose them 
to additional liability if the broker harms another customer or if 
the firm fails to set up adequate enhanced supervision.129 
FINRA tells its firms that they should consider, among other 
things, “a pattern of unadjudicated matters, such as 
unadjudicated customer complaints” in determining whether to 
implement heightened supervision for a particular broker.130 
Successful expungements may cause a “pattern” to disappear 
from the regulatory record, removing the need for heightened 
supervision. 
One rare unsuccessful expungement attempt showcases 
how a brokerage firm’s interest generally aligns with a broker’s 
interest. In 2019, Paul Douglas Larson named brokerage firm 
Larson Financial Securities, LLC as a respondent in an 
arbitration where he sought an expungement.131 BrokerCheck 
reveals that the managing member of Larson Financial 
Securities, LLC is Larson Financial Holdings, LLC.132 A 
disclosure form for an affiliated entity reveals that Paul Douglas 
 
 127. See Honigsberg & Jacob, supra note 22, at 6 (recognizing that 
brokerage firms care more about public, rather than private, misconduct).  
 128. See Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Reg. Notice 18-15 Guidance on 
Implementing Effective Heightened Supervisory Procedures 2 (Apr. 30, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/UB23-PYRE (PDF) (discussing heightened supervision 
requirements). 
 129. See id. at 3 (“The failure to assess the adequacy of its supervisory 
procedures in light of an associated person’s history of industry or 
regulatory-related incidents would be closely evaluated in determining 
whether the firm itself should be subject to disciplinary action for a failure to 
supervise.”). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Larson v. Larson Fin. Secs., LLC, No. 19-02660, 2020 WL 2494751, 
at *1 (May 5, 2020) (Matek, Arb.). 
 132. Larson Financial Securities, LLC, BROKERCHECK, https://perma.cc
/R4DX-FWZZ. 
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Larson is a control person for Larson Financial Holdings.133 In 
essence, Paul Douglas Larson filed an arbitration against an 
entity he controls, and somehow managed to defy the odds and 
lose.134 The loss might be attributable to unnamed customers 
who “filed submissions in opposition to the request for 
expungement.”135 Notably, one customer actually “appeared at 
the expungement hearing” and counsel for the customers 
“appeared at all of the hearings on expungement and opposed” 
the request.136 
e. Arbitrator Selection Pressure 
Arbitrators within FINRA’s forum also face incentives to 
facilitate expungement requests. FINRA’s arbitrators serve as 
independent contractors and are paid by the number of hearing 
sessions they conduct.137 Although an arbitrator might request 
additional information and conduct additional, lengthy hearing 
sessions for expungement requests, the arbitrator would likely 
only get to do this once.138 Critically, repeat business for 
arbitrators depends on being selected to conduct arbitrations 
and only the named parties have any say in the arbitrator 
selection process.139 An arbitrator who denies expungement 
requests will likely stop receiving expungement cases. 
When a broker seeking an expungement files a FINRA 
arbitration against an employer, both the broker and the 
employer will participate in FINRA’s arbitrator selection 
 
 133. LARSON FIN. GRP., LLC, FORM ADV, CRD NUMBER: 140599 28–29 
(2020), https://perma.cc/79EA-RFGN (PDF). 
 134. Larson, 2020 WL 2494751, at *1. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 13214 (2019). 
 138. See Kate Webber Nuñez, Toxic Cultures Require a Stronger Cure: The 
Lessons of Fox News for Reforming Sexual Harassment Law, 122 PENN ST. L. 
REV. 463, 507–08 (2018) (“Arbitrators also have financial incentives to favor 
employers who, unlike employees, are in a position to hire the arbitrator again 
in the future.”). 
 139. Cf. Bradley A. Areheart, Organizational Justice and 
Antidiscrimination, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1921, 1945 (2020) (“[E]mployers, as 
‘repeat players,’ can choose arbitrators that have been known to rule in favor 
of other employers.”). 
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process.140 To reduce costs and trigger a proceeding with a single 
arbitrator, brokers have been filing these actions with a claim 
for $1.00 in nominal damages, a practice FINRA recently moved 
to constrain.141 To select the single arbitrator who will hear the 
case, FINRA first provides a list of ten names to the claimant 
and the respondent.142 Both the claimant and the respondent 
may each strike up to four arbitrators from the list and rank the 
remaining arbitrators.143 If both the claimant and the 
respondent favor arbitrators who routinely grant 
expungements, an arbitrator who occasionally rejects an 
expungement request may be less likely to be selected.144 
Some evidence suggests that parties in expungement-only 
cases prefer arbitrators who routinely grant expungements. A 
recent study by the PIABA Foundation found that the three 
arbitrators most frequently selected for expungement-only 
cases “granted expungement requests over 95% of the time.”145 
 
 140. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., FINRA’S DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS 3 
(2012), https://perma.cc/93BS-29ZT (PDF) (“Both sides are allowed to remove 
or strike some of the arbitrators on the list of consideration and to rank the 
remaining names in order of their preference.”). 
 141. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Amend the FINRA 
Code of Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes and the FINRA Code of 
Arbitration Procedure for Industry Disputes to Apply Minimum Fees to 
Requests for Expungement of Customer Dispute Information, 85 Fed. Reg. 
11,165, 11,167 (Feb. 26, 2020) (“FINRA is aware that associated persons who 
file a straight-in request often add a small monetary claim (typically, one 
dollar) to the expungement request to reduce the fees assessed against the 
associated person and qualify for an arbitration heard by a single arbitrator.”). 
 142. See Arbitrator Selection, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc
/MF44-TY7M (“For claims of up to $100,000, the parties receive one list of 10 
chair-qualified non-public arbitrators . . . . For claims of more than $100,000 
for unspecified or non-monetary claims, the parties receive two lists (one 
including 10 non-public chair-qualified arbitrators, and one including 20 
non-public arbitrators).”). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See David A. Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 
WASH. U. L. REV. 165, 217 (2019) (“[A]rbitrators face incentive structures to 
not depart from the parties’ settled expectations, and are not rewarded, 
reputationally or otherwise, for issuing public-facing rulings.”). 
 145. DOSS & BRAGANÇA, supra note 88, at 4. 
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f. Weak Institutional Oversight Incentives 
FINRA also faces institutional constraints limiting its 
ability to vigorously protect information contained in the 
CRD.146 Critically, reviewing and challenging arbitration 
awards in court would consume substantial time and resources. 
My search revealed 935 different arbitration awards involving 
expungement in 2019 alone. Effective review and oversight 
would likely require substantial independent investigation, 
something FINRA never committed to do when it agreed to 
create and manage the CRD database. Although FINRA has 
responded to criticisms of its expungement process and made 
significant reforms over the years, it has not generally led 
efforts to protect information contained in the CRD.147 Its 
members may also not push FINRA to lead efforts to preserve 
the public availability of unflattering information about 
brokers.148 
2. Arbitrator Fact-Finding in Expungement Hearings 
There are two different routes to an expungement hearing 
within FINRA’s arbitration forum, either at the conclusion of a 
customer arbitration or in a separate arbitration without 
naming the complaining customer as a party. Brokers named as 
parties to a customer arbitration “may request expungement 
during that arbitration, but [are] not required to do so.”149 In 
practice, many brokers have waited “years after FINRA closed 
 
 146. See Benjamin P. Edwards, The Dark Side of Self-Regulation, 85 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 573, 608 (2017) (“[S]elf-regulatory bodies may be particularly 
lethargic protectors in situations where actions in the public’s interest would 
undercut private profits.”). 
 147. See Mason Braswell & Jed Horowitz, Top Merrill Broker Patrick 
Dwyer Leaves Amid Accusations, ADVISORHUB (Aug. 22, 2019), https://
perma.cc/7YKF-5GGM (describing FINRA’s move to block confirmation of an 
arbitration award directing expungement as a “rare step”). 
 148. See, e.g., Honigsberg & Jacob, supra note 22, at 7 (describing a human 
resources office’s decision to ignore allegations of an employee’s misconduct 
until that misconduct became public).  
 149. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Reg. Notice 17-42 Expungement of Customer 
Dispute Information 5 (Dec. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/HB2Z-YAV3 (PDF).  
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the Underlying Customer Case” to request expungement.150 
Troublingly, these delays often mean that important evidence 
and witnesses have been lost to the passage of time.151 
Adversarial failure explains many stale expungements. 
Under the arbitration forum’s rules, brokers should face at least 
some challenge pursuing an expungement through FINRA 
arbitration after more than six years from the time the 
information appeared in the CRD database.152 FINRA’s rules 
explain that its arbitration forum may only be used within six 
years of the occurrence or event giving rise to the claim.153 
Despite this, arbitrators regularly expunge information dating 
back 20 years or more.154 Arbitrators may not apply—or even 
consider—the eligibility rule because no party to the arbitration 
points out that the dispute may no longer be eligible to be heard 
in the FINRA forum.155 Of course, arbitrators may interpret the 
rule in some way allowing access to the forum, but it appears 
odd that arbitrators do not regularly even consider the issue 
when presented with stale expungement requests. 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. See id. (“Given the length of time between case closure and filing of 
the request, in many of these instances, the customers cannot be located and 
any documentation that could explain what happened in the case is not 
available or cannot be located.”). 
 152. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 13206 (2011) (explaining that in 
industry disputes “[n]o claim shall be eligible for submission to arbitration 
under the Code where six years have elapsed from the occurrence or event 
giving rise to the claim”). 
 153. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 12206 (2011) (directing that in 
customer disputes “[n]o claim shall be eligible for submission to arbitration 
under the Code where six years have elapsed from the occurrence or event 
giving rise to the claim”). 
 154. See Rosenberg v. A. G. Edwards & Sons, No. 19-02801, 2020 WL 
2494754, at *2 (May 8, 2020) (Mintzer, Arb.) (recommending expungement 
where the underlying information “was received by Respondent on July 17, 
2000 and solely alleged ‘breach of fiduciary duty’ concerning an ‘Equity Listed 
(Common & Preferred Stock)’”). 
 155. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 12206 (2011) (placing responsibility 
for determining eligibility on the party who submits the claim, not the 
arbitrator).  
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Notably, the current rules do not require brokers to make 
the complaining customer a party.156 Brokers will frequently file 
their action against a current or former employer and provide 
notice to a customer shortly before the final evidentiary 
hearing.157 Brokers name their employers on the theory that the 
employers were the ones who actually reported the information 
to the CRD.158 These expungement-only arbitrations have 
dramatically increased in recent years. The PIABA Foundation 
found that expungement-only cases increased “924% from 2015 
to 2018.”159 
The trend has continued since that time. Consider one 
recent arbitration award recommending expungement.160 
Steven Phillip Margulin sued his current employer, Centaurus 
Financial, Inc., “seeking expungement of a customer complaint” 
and relying on evidence from 2003—seventeen years ago.161 In 
responding to Margulin’s complaint, “Centaurus stated that it 
does not oppose” the “expungement request.”162 Margulin 
provided notice to the estate of the deceased customer on 
February 21, 2020, and a telephonic hearing was held 
thirty-three days later on March 25, 2020.163 The arbitrator 
granted the request and recommended that the customer 
dispute information be expunged from the CRD database, 
 
 156. FINRA’s training materials for its arbitrators note that brokers may 
“file an arbitration claim against a member firm solely for the purpose of 
seeking expungement, without naming the customer in the underlying dispute 
as a respondent.” FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., FINRA OFFICE OF DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION EXPUNGEMENT TRAINING 14 (2016), https://perma.cc/NLE2-6657 
(PDF) [hereinafter EXPUNGEMENT TRAINING]. 
 157. See id. (“[A]rbitrators should order the associated persons to provide 
a copy of their Statement of Claim to the customer(s) involved in the 
underlying arbitration.”). 
 158. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 4530 (2015) (requiring the firm to 
report broker misconduct).  
 159. DOSS & BRAGANÇA, supra note 88, at 3. 
 160. See Margulin v. Centaurus Fin., Inc., No. 19-01639, 2020 WL 
1943589, at *3 (Apr. 17, 2020) (Tindall, Arb.) (recommending “the 
expungement of all references to the Underlying Complaint”). 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
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finding that the information was “false.”164 Once Margulin 
confirms the award in court, the information will be deleted 
from the CRD database. Yet, if asked, an arbitrator might have 
found this expungement request ineligible for arbitration under 
FINRA’s Rules because the dispute was over six years old.165 
With limited information and briefing, arbitrators regularly 
make critical factual findings bearing on whether past customer 
complaints should be expunged from the public record. Today, 
arbitrators must at least hold hearings before granting 
expungement requests.166 FINRA explains that arbitrators 
should only recommend expungement of customer dispute 
information from the public record “when the expunged 
information has no meaningful regulatory or investor protection 
value.”167 
The process has evolved over time as FINRA has 
implemented change after change to address known problems. 
When past guidance directing arbitrators to make findings did 
not generate consistent affirmative findings by arbitrators, 
FINRA amended its code.168 Both FINRA Rule 12805 (customer 
disputes) and Rule 13805 (industry disputes) now “establish 
specific procedures that arbitrators must follow before ordering 
expungement of customer dispute information from the CRD 
system.”169 
Arbitration awards recommending expungement must 
contain specific findings.170 Although arbitrators do not 
 
 164. Id.  
 165. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 13206 (2011) (“No claim shall be 
eligible for submission to arbitration under the Code where six years have 
elapsed from the occurrence or event giving rise to the claim.”).  
 166. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 12805 (2009); id. RULE 13805. 
 167. Frequently Asked Questions about FINRA Rule 2080 (Expungement), 
FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc/D7WW-APB2 [hereinafter FAQ 
About FINRA Rule 2080]. 
 168. See Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Reg. Notice 08-79 Expungement 1 (Dec. 
2008), https://perma.cc/ZTX7-3QPZ (PDF) (describing changes to FINRA’s 
procedural codes for both customer and industry disputes).  
 169. Id. at 2. 
 170. See FAQ About FINRA Rule 2080, supra note 167 (“Arbitrators 
considering expungement relief are required to complete training provided by 
FINRA Dispute Resolution regarding . . . the requirement to make specific 
findings if they decide that expungement is appropriate.”).  
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ordinarily have to explain any basis for their decisions, FINRA 
Rule 12805 and 13805 require the arbitrator to “indicate in the 
arbitration award which of the Rule 2080 grounds for 
expungement serves as the basis for its expungement order.”171 
For example, an arbitrator might find that a broker had no 
involvement in a customer complaint or that it was false 
because the broker did not even work at the firm at the time of 
the alleged misconduct.172 It also requires arbitrators to 
“provide a brief written explanation of the reason(s) for its 
finding that one or more Rule 2080 grounds for expungement 
applies to the facts of the case.”173 In approving the rule change, 
the SEC found that “additional procedures, such as the required 
review of settlement documents, and the written explanation of 
the regulatory basis and reason for granting expungement, in 
the proposed rule are designed to help assure that the 
expungement process is not abused.”174 The SEC also 
encouraged FINRA to “use its authority to review expungement 
requests to ensure that expungement is an extraordinary 
remedy.”175  
FINRA’s training materials instruct the arbitrators 
crafting these findings. They explain that the “written 
explanation should provide regulators and other interested 
parties with additional insight into why the arbitrators 
recommended expungement and any facts and circumstances 
they found in support of the recommendation.”176 While the goal 
of the rule change was to ensure that arbitrators were 
recommending expungement selectively as an “extraordinary 
remedy,” that appears not to have happened.177 Arbitration 
 
 171. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 12805(c) (2009); id. RULE 13805(c). 
 172. See id. RULE 2080 (“Upon request, FINRA may waive the obligation 
to name FINRA as a party if FINRA determines that . . . the registered person 
was not involved in the alleged investment-related sale practice violation.”).  
 173. Id. RULE 12805. 
 174. Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change Amending the Codes of 
Arbitration Procedure to Establish Procedures for Arbitrators to Follow When 
Considering Requests for Expungement Relief, 73 Fed. Reg. 66,086, 66,089 
(Nov. 6, 2008).  
 175. Id. at 15. 
 176. EXPUNGEMENT TRAINING, supra note 156, at 16. 
 177. Id. at 8.  
  
1090 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053 (2020) 
 
awards recommending expungement are more prevalent than 
before and generally do not show evidence of having considered 
any evidence against expungement.178 
3. Customers Receive Inconsistent and Limited Notice  
No FINRA Rule now requires a broker to provide notice to 
a former customer about an expungement hearing.179 The rules 
also do not require any notice to the securities regulators in 
states where the broker holds a license. The “requirement” to 
provide notice appears in the arbitrator training materials, 
which explain than an arbitrator must “order the associated 
persons to provide a copy of their Statement of Claim to the 
customer(s).”180 FINRA emphasizes that “without this directive 
from the arbitrators, the customer(s) may not even be aware 
that an expungement claim is pending regarding their prior 
dispute.”181  
a. Arbitrators Do Not Always Require Notice 
Despite guidance instructing them to require notice be 
given to former customers, arbitrators do not always actually 
require that customers receive notice. In some instances, 
customers receive no notice before arbitrators hold hearings to 
 
 178. See DOSS & BRAGANÇA, supra note 125 (“But today, the floodgates are 
wide open and the number of expungement cases filed by brokers against their 
brokerage firms has risen nearly 1,000% in the last four years.”). 
 179. Although FINRA’s Board of Governors approved codifying its 
expanded expungement guidance in 2018, it has not yet codified the guidance. 
See Update: FINRA Board of Governors Meeting, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH. (Dec. 
21, 2018), https://perma.cc/9CUE-FVVL (“The Board approved proposed 
amendments to the Codes of Arbitration Procedure for Customer and Industry 
Disputes to codify the Notice to Arbitrators and Parties on Expanded 
Expungement Guidance and modify the fees for small claim expungement.”). 
 180. EXPUNGEMENT TRAINING, supra note 156, at 14. 
 181. See id. (elaborating that “notice provides the customer(s) with the 
opportunity to advise the arbitrators and parties of their position on the 
expungement request, which may assist arbitrators in making the appropriate 
finding under Rule 2080”). 
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determine whether to recommend expungement.182 This may 
occur when counsel for a party argues for some idiosyncratic 
interpretation of FINRA’s guidance. For example, in one 
arbitration, the attorney argued that he did not need to provide 
notice to three different customers because “it was his position 
that the notification requirements of an expungement request 
applies to customers who have filed for arbitration.”183 The 
arbitration panel agreed.184 
b. Short Notice Windows 
Determining actual notice times remains difficult. 
Arbitration awards do not always reveal the date on which a 
broker seeking expungement notifies a former customer that a 
hearing will be held. For example, Mark Kravietz procured an 
arbitration award recommending that customer information be 
expunged from public records on May 1, 2020.185 Although the 
award does not reveal the date on which notice was sent to the 
customer, Kravietz provided FINRA with an Affirmation of 
Service on or about April 9, 2020, before a telephonic hearing 
was held on April 28, 2020, just nineteen days later.186 
Unsurprisingly, the award found that the “underlying customer 
did not participate in the expungement hearing and did not 
oppose the request for expungement.”187  
Although arbitrators do not seem to aggressively police 
notice periods, they may balk at egregiously short periods. In 
one instance, an arbitrator postponed an expungement hearing 
on account of inadequate notice.188 The broker had transmitted 
 
 182. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 
16-02781, 2017 WL 3189311, at *1 (July 20, 2017) (Ainbinder, Thorpe, & 
Santillo, Arbs.) (recommending expungement of six customer complaints even 
though the broker made no attempt to notify three of the customers). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id.  
 185. Kravietz v. U.S. Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 20-00601, 2020 WL 2235746, at 
*1 (May 1, 2020) (Lascar, Arb.). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Papadopoulos v. Lasalle Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 17-01201, 2018 WL 
1452616, at *2 (Mar. 16, 2018) (Murphy, Arb.) (“The Arbitrator postponed the 
expungement hearing due to inadequate notice.”). 
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notice of the hearing “via priority express mail notice” just three 
days before the hearing.189  
FINRA’s expungement training materials do not specify 
that notice must go out any particular number of days before a 
hearing may be held.190 While there are FINRA Rules specifying 
dates for motions and responses in its forum, the time period for 
a customer to receive notice remains undefined.191 This also 
contrasts with the law for class action settlement approvals 
which require notice to be sent to important stakeholders both 
within ten days after any proposed settlement is filed and at 
least ninety days before a court can grant approval.192 Notice 
norms in expungement cases fall far short of the usual sixty-day 
period under the federal rules for a defendant to respond to a 
complaint after waiving service or for a defendant to respond to 
a statement of claim within the FINRA arbitration forum.193 
c. Vague and Discouraging Notice Language 
Neither FINRA’s expungement guidance nor its arbitrator 
training materials require the notice to be provided in any 
particular form, leaving self-interested parties free to craft 
notice language in ways seemingly calculated to suppress 
customer participation. For example, consider the notice 
language used in one letter sent to notify a customer of about an 
expungement hearing.194 The letter opens with legalese, stating 
that “[p]ursuant to FINRA’s Published Guidance, ‘Notice to 
Arbitrators and Parties on Expanded Expungement Guidance,’ 
we are notifying you that a request for customer dispute 
 
 189. Id. 
 190. EXPUNGEMENT TRAINING, supra note 156, at 14. 
 191. See, e.g., FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 13503(a)(3) (2017) (“Written 
motions must be served at least 20 days before a scheduled hearing, unless 
the panel decides otherwise.”).  
 192. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b), (d) (2018). 
 193. See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(3) (“A defendant who, before being served with 
process, timely returns a waiver need not serve an answer to the complaint 
until 60 days after the request was sent—or until 90 days after it was sent to 
the defendant outside any judicial district of the United States.”). 
 194. Letter from Dochtor D. Kennedy, President & Founder, Advisor Law, 
LLC to Dan Tennent (Dec. 31, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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expungement relief has been filed in the aforementioned 
case.”195 The letter seems calculated to discourage, stating that 
“[y]ou are not a party to this case and are under no duty or 
obligation to answer, respond, participate or engage in any 
manner.”196 Although the letter does reveal the date and time of 
the hearing, it does not tell the recipient where it is or how to 
actually participate in these primarily telephonic hearings.197 A 
motivated, proactive customer would have to take additional 
steps to gather more information in order to participate. 
Importantly, customer participation provides extraordinary 
value to an arbitration panel considering an expungement 
request. When a customer does not participate, an arbitration 
panel will often receive no evidence to contradict a broker’s 
testimony.198 A notice seemingly calculated to discourage their 
participation increases the likelihood that an arbitrator will 
later render a poorly informed decision.199 
4. Unclear Standards of Proof 
Identifying how these grounds should be interpreted or 
what standard of proof an arbitrator should apply in reviewing 
an expungement request remains difficult. Arbitrator training 
materials do not contain any reference to common standards of 
proof such as by a “preponderance” of the evidence, by “clear and 
convincing” evidence, or “beyond a reasonable doubt.”200 One 
arbitrator concluded that the standard surely must be higher 
than a preponderance of the evidence because FINRA does not 
remove a customer complaint if the customer does not prevail in 
arbitration under an ordinary preponderance standard of civil 
 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id.  
 198. See, e.g., Royal All. Assocs. v. Liebhaber, 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805, 813 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (“[N]o evidence was presented or information not disputed 
[sic] because the arbitrators did not allow Ms. Liebhaber to present any 
evidence at the hearing despite her appearance and multiple requests to do 
so.”). 
 199. See id. (describing how the arbitrators prevented the client from 
presenting evidence at the hearing).  
 200. EXPUNGEMENT TRAINING, supra note 156. 
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proof.201 The arbitrator recognized that if an “allegation is 
supported by some reasonable proof, even short of 
‘preponderance,’ it cannot be said to be ‘false.’ Unfortunately, 
too many decisions improperly label ‘false’ claims simply 
because they were not supported by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”202  
Despite this reasoning, most arbitrators seemingly apply a 
preponderance standard to recommend expunging significant 
information after a quick, one-sided hearing where only the 
broker seeking expungement presents any evidence.203 Consider 
a recent arbitration award recommending the expungement of 
twelve different items from the CRD for two brokers.204 The two 
brokers brought an arbitration against Geneos Wealth 
Management, Inc., which “did not appear at the expungement 
hearing and did not contest the expungement requests.”205 The 
arbitrator found that “the Customers were served with the 
Statement of Claim and received notice of the expungement 
hearing” at some unspecified date before the hearing.206 At a 
hearing where only the brokers appeared, the arbitrator found 
that “preponderance of the evidence adduced at the 
expungement hearing” supported a series of factual findings.207 
Altogether, the brokers successfully erased “five FINRA 
arbitration cases, [one] civil court case and two customer 
complaints” from the CRD.208 The arbitrator reached this 
 
 201. See Gilliam v. Sagepoint Fin., Inc., No. 12-03717, 2013 WL 3963949, 
at *2 (July 22, 2013) (Meyer, Arb.) (“[The customer] failed to prove his/her case 
by a preponderance of the evidence . . . the allegations nevertheless appear on 
the respondents’ CRD records . . . . From this it may be inferred that to 
expunge . . . something more than a preponderance of the evidence is 
required.”). 
 202. Id. at *3. 
 203. See, e.g., Royal All. Assocs., 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 813 (discussing the 
one-sided evidence presented at the hearing).  
 204. Arford v. Geneos Wealth Mgmt., Inc., No. 19-00739, 2019 WL 
5681728, at *1 (Oct. 24, 2019) (Cutler, Arb.). 
 205. Id. at *2. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
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conclusion after just a single hearing session on the 
expungement requests which lasted four hours or less.209  
Importantly, the arbitration systems seem unlikely to ever 
definitively resolve this standard of proof issue or meaningfully 
engage with arbitration decisions which do address the issue. 
Arbitrations do not create any binding precedent and a 
thoughtful resolution of the standard of proof issue by one 
arbitrator will not bind another.210 Parties to arbitrations do not 
even need to inform the arbitration panel about arbitration 
decisions interpreting the grounds because they are not legal 
authority.211 Although arbitration remains an “equitable” 
forum, the arbitrators may only seek to do equity between the 
named or appearing parties and not to the silent stakeholders 
who do not appear in the proceeding.212 
5. Limited Rights for Customers to Participate 
FINRA Rules do not contain any provisions explicitly 
providing for a right for customers to participate in 
expungement hearings before information about their disputes 
are erased from the public record. Instead, FINRA provides 
guidance to arbitrators and instructs them to allow customers 
to participate in expungement hearings. In guidance, FINRA 
notifies arbitrators that it is “important to allow customers and 
their counsel to participate in the expungement hearing in 
 
 209. Id. at *7. Within FINRA’s arbitration system, a “hearing session is 
any meeting between the parties and arbitrator(s) of four hours or less.” 
Summary of Arbitration Fees, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc/7DA4-
7EMY. 
 210. See Edwards, supra note 43, at 434 (pointing out that arbitration 
“cannot ‘answer’ these questions in any meaningful way because their 
decisions do not create precedent”). 
 211. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) 
(requiring a lawyer to inform a tribunal about controlling legal authority). 
 212. Cf. Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: 
The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 1029–30 
(2002) (“Arbitrators are expected to achieve an equitable resolution of the 
dispute before them but they may not ignore the law. However, without ample 
training or legal briefing by the parties on each relevant issue, how can the 
arbitrators know what the law is or how to apply it?”). 
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settled cases if they wish to.”213 The guidance instructs 
arbitrators that they should allow customers to appear with 
counsel, testify, introduce documents and evidence, 
cross-examine witnesses, and “present opening and closing 
arguments if the panel allows any party to present such 
arguments.”214 
FINRA issued the guidance after arbitrators in its forum 
declined to allow a customer’s counsel to cross-examine a broker 
who testified in favor of her own expungement request.215 In this 
case, the customer claimant had already settled in part because 
the arbitration panel would not require the brokerage firm to 
provide discovery or allow her to present any oral argument on 
motions.216 In this instance, the customer had clear notice 
because the expungement hearing occurred within the 
customer-initiated arbitration and the customer remained a 
named party to the arbitration.217 The broker, Kathleen J. Tarr, 
gave an unsworn monologue that the allegations were “highly 
offensive and without basis in any fact” and that she was “the 
daughter and granddaughter of ministers.”218 When counsel for 
the customer sought to introduce the customer’s contrary 
testimony and to question Tarr, the arbitration panel’s 
chairperson stated that he did not “see that any testimony such 
as this is necessary.”219 When another arbitrator suggested 
hearing the customer out to generate a complete record, the 
chair responded “how can we make sure we're not going to be 
here for another two hours? That’s the problem.”220 Ultimately, 
 
 213. Notice to Arbitrators and Parties on Expanded Expungement 
Guidance, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH. (Sept. 2017), https://perma.cc/542Y-UNSN. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See Robert S. Banks, Jr., Muzzling the Claimant Due Process Denied 
in FINRA Expungement Hearing, 21 PIABA B.J. 397, 397 (2014) (describing a 
FINRA expungement hearing where a customer and counsel were not 
permitted to fully participate). 
 216. Id. at 397 (describing a client who settled an action after an 
arbitration panel chair “refused to allow oral argument on any of our motions 
and refused to refer our motions to the full panel”). 
 217. Notably, brokers do not have to seek an expungement in the same 
action. Many wait to name their employers in a subsequent action. 
 218. Banks, supra note 215, at 398. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
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the three-arbitrator panel declined to allow the customer or 
counsel to fully participate and unanimously recommended 
expungement anyway.221 Surprisingly, despite the protests of 
the customer’s counsel, not one of the arbitrators dissented from 
the decision.222 
With the assistance of pro bono counsel, the customer 
sought to vacate the arbitration award.223 In Royal Alliance 
Associates, Inc. v. Liebhaber,224 the customer explained that she 
had a real interest in the expungement proceeding “because the 
award deemed her complaints against Tarr false and therefore 
found her ‘essentially to have been a liar without anyone 
hearing from her or giving her a right to cross-examine’” Tarr.225 
With FINRA also opposing confirmation, the award was 
ultimately vacated because the arbitrators refused to hear 
evidence from a party to the arbitration.226  
FINRA’s current guidance and training materials seem 
designed to address the specific problems that arose in the Royal 
Alliance arbitration.227 It instructs arbitrators to permit 
customers to do the specific things the customer was not allowed 
to do in Royal Alliance, including appearing, presenting 
testimony, and cross-examining any witnesses.  
 
 221. See Liebhaber v. Royal All. Assocs., No. 13-01522, 2014 WL 4647001, 
at *2 (Sept. 10, 2014) (Stall, Jr., McLaughlin, & Aragon, Arbs.) (“Panel 
recommends the expungement of all references to the above-captioned 
arbitration from non-party Kathleen Tarr’s (CRD #4215307) registration 
records maintained by the CRD.”). 
 222. As discussed below, arbitrators may decline to oppose expungement 
requests because they fear they will not be selected for future panels if they 
do. See supra Part II.C.1.e.  
 223. See Banks, supra note 215, at 400 (explaining that the customer “filed 
an opposition to the confirmation petition and a request that the Award be 
vacated, with generous assistance from . . . pro bono counsel”). 
 224. 206 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
 225. Id. at 814. 
 226. Id. at 1110 (“[A]rbitrators gave Royal Alliance an unfettered 
opportunity to bolster the written record but denied Liebhaber even a limited 
chance to do the same.”). 
 227. See Notice to Arbitrators and Parties on Expanded Expungement 
Guidance, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc/PR8L-BDAN (last updated 
Sept. 2017) (“It is important to allow customers and their counsel to 
participate in the expungement hearing in settled cases if they wish to.”). 
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The guidance fails to address the many instances where a 
broker brings a separate expungement action to which the 
customer is not a party. The guidance does not facilitate full 
participation. Although FINRA’s guidance calls for arbitrators 
to require brokers to provide notice and a copy of their 
statement of claim when seeking an expungement, it does not 
generally call for customers to have copies of everything that 
has been submitted to the arbitrators.228 As a result, customers 
cannot see any answer that has been filed, participate in 
arbitrator selection, readily view all other documents which 
have been submitted, or even know what the arbitration panel 
has been told about them in earlier hearings in the matter. This 
puts the customers who do participate at a substantial 
disadvantage in the matter.  
Thus, even an unusually savvy customer who opted to 
participate in expungement hearings where she was not a party 
will struggle to oppose confirmation of any arbitration award. 
Even after expending the time and effort necessary to oppose an 
arbitration award, a customer will not receive notice of any 
award when FINRA delivers it to the parties.229 The customer 
must search FINRA’s arbitration database to find out the 
result.230 
The customer also receives no notice of the next 
step— confirmation of the arbitration award in court. As the 
customer was not a party to the arbitration, the customer will 
not receive notice when a party seeks to confirm the arbitration 
award.231 This makes it practically impossible for customers to 
block confirmation. 
 
 228. See EXPUNGEMENT TRAINING, supra note 156, at 14 (“[N]otice provides 
the customer(s) with the opportunity to advise the arbitrators and parties of 
their position on the expungement request, which may assist arbitrators in 
making the appropriate finding.”). 
 229. See Decision & Award, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., https://perma.cc
/QEP4-LDAR (“Once the award is signed by a majority of the arbitrators, 
FINRA will send copies of the award to each party or representative of the 
party.”).  
 230. See id. (“FINRA makes all arbitration awards publicly available for 
free by posting them on Arbitration Awards Online.”). 
 231. See id. (explaining the confirmation process).  
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6. No Independent Investigation in Arbitration 
 Facilitating expungements through arbitrations also 
largely prevents any independent fact-finding into the 
underlying disputes. FINRA’s training materials for arbitrators 
instruct that arbitrators “should not make independent factual 
investigations of a case.”232 Although FINRA encourages 
arbitrators to ask questions of the parties and for the parties to 
provide any briefing requested by the arbitrator, its guidance 
makes clear that arbitrators “generally should review only those 
materials presented by the parties.”233  
 A rule against any independent investigation makes the 
most sense when purely private parties with equal resources 
have contracted for an arbitrator to decide a dispute. It makes 
less sense when it puts public information at risk and forces 
arbitrators to refrain from conducting even the most 
rudimentary of independent investigations. 
D. Past Problems 
The incentives and processes detailed above have left 
FINRA continually struggling to manage the 
arbitration-facilitated expungement process. As explained 
below, FINRA has moved to address some past problems, yet 
resolving these concerns has not substantially improved the 
process. 
1. Stipulated Expungements after Settlements 
For years, brokers secured expungements through 
stipulated awards agreed to as part of a settlement process.234 
In explaining the operation of NASD Rule 2130, an earlier 
 
 232. FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., FINRA DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERVICES 
ARBITRATOR’S GUIDE 60 (2020), https://perma.cc/9DR9-49CC (PDF). 
 233. Id. 
 234. See Christine Lazaro, Has Expungement Broken Brokercheck?, 14 J. 
BUS. & SEC. L. 125, 136 (2014) (“[P]arties would place a stipulated award 
before the arbitrators containing an expungement directive, which the 
arbitrators would then sign. The broker would then confirm the award in a 
court of competent jurisdiction either with the consent of the customer or by 
default if the customer did not appear.”). 
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version of FINRA Rule 2080, FINRA explained how brokers 
could procure a stipulated award containing the findings 
necessary to have information about the dispute expunged from 
public records.235 The process was straightforward. Settling 
parties simply asked the arbitration panel “for a stipulated 
award and request[ed] that the panel make affirmative findings 
and order expungement based on one or more of the standards 
in Rule 2130.”236 After Rule 2130 came into effect, FINRA noted 
that arbitrators would still state in the award the basis on which 
the expungement relief was granted.”237  
Stipulated awards sat in tension with the rule’s 
requirement that an expungement recommendation be “based 
on affirmative judicial or arbitral findings.”238 FINRA’s 
guidance on stipulated expungement awards did not direct 
arbitrators to make any searching inquiry to protect the public’s 
interest in the accuracy and reliability of CRD information. 
After all, an arbitrator ordinarily sits to resolve a private 
dispute, not to play some public enforcement role. One scholar 
explained that the “message in the Notice is that the arbitrators’ 
role is to execute the request for expungement rather than 
conduct an independent, skeptical review.”239 Notably, the SEC 
never directly addressed stipulated awards in its order 
approving NASD Rule 2130.240 
But concerns about stipulated awards and the risk that 
brokers would force customers to agree to expungement as a 
settlement condition had been raised. One prescient commenter 
 
 235. Nat. Ass’n Secs. Dealers, Notice to Members 04-16 Expungement of 
Customer Dispute Information from the CRD 214 (March 2004), https://
perma.cc/E7HJ-5NHW (PDF). FINRA was known as the National Association 
of Securities Dealers (NASD) until 2007, when it became FINRA.  
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Lipner, supra note 91, at 76.  
 240. See Order Granting Approval and Notice of Filing and Order 
Granting Accelerated Approval Relating to Proposed NASD Rule 2130 
Concerning the Expungement of Customer Dispute Information from the 
Central Registration Depository System No. 34–48933, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,667, 
74,667 (Dec. 24, 2003) (discussing requirements for obtaining an order of 
expungement of customer dispute information from the central registration 
depository).  
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argued that a “broker should not be allowed to purchase a clean 
CRD from a destitute customer. This is especially true when the 
broker is the reason the customer is destitute.”241  The 
commenter also panned judicial confirmation as a “phony 
safeguard” because customers were not likely to appear at 
confirmation hearings and they would be granted “without 
independent review unless the NASD objects.”242  
Over time, stipulated awards facilitating the expungement 
of information likely did real harm to the public by enabling 
fraud and misconduct to go undetected. Consider the aftermath 
of one stipulated expungement. Carl Martellaro served as a 
principal for First Associated Securities Group, a firm FINRA 
expelled from the securities industry in the year 2000.243 Years 
before FINRA discovered wrongdoing and expelled the firm, two 
investors alleged that Martellaro had run a fraudulent scheme 
causing them to lose $1.75 million.244 Martellaro settled the 
dispute on the condition that the investors would not oppose his 
subsequent request to expunge information about their 
complaint from public records.245 He succeeded and later went 
on to run a Ponzi scheme causing other investors to suffer $125 
million in losses.246 The attorney who represented the first two 
investors explained that although his clients “cut a deal, . . . the 
public got cut out.”247  
These deals left only a faint trace behind. A search of 
arbitration awards reveals that Martellaro successfully 
expunged at least two disputes from his record before his Ponzi 
scheme ultimately collapsed. In 1999, an arbitration award 
directed that a dispute alleging $1.25 million in damages be 
 
 241. Letter from Barry D. Estell to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 28, 2003) 
(arguing that an “agreement to expunge an arbitration claim is inherently 
corrupt and contrary to the purpose of the CRD”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 242. Id. 
 243. First Associated Securities Group, Inc., BROKERCHECK, https://
perma.cc/5KYC-Y6F6. 
 244. Michael Freedman, The X-ed Out Files, FORBES (Dec. 25, 2000, 12:00 
AM), https://perma.cc/23HN-9D3F. 
 245. Id.  
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. 
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expunged.248 In the same year, arbitrators also directed that 
another claim alleging $500,000 in damages be expunged.249 On 
both occasions, the parties secured a stipulated award calling 
for the information to be expunged.250  
In Martellaro’s case, the expungement of dispute 
information likely facilitated his ongoing fraud. Investors doing 
ordinary diligence would not see complaint information on his 
record. Regulators surveying the CRD records for red flags 
involving brokers operating within their territory would also not 
have seen the information. 
State regulators eventually intervened to oppose the 
confirmation of some stipulated awards with mixed success.251 
In 2007, Maryland sought to block the confirmation of a 
stipulated expungement award, arguing that the Maryland 
Securities Commissioner “has a substantial interest in ensuring 
the integrity of her records.”252 The customer had collected a 
$47,000 settlement on the condition that she stipulate to the 
expungement of all reference to the dispute.253 After the district 
court initially rejected Maryland’s request to intervene, the D.C. 
Circuit found that the state regulator should be allowed to 
intervene as of right because Maryland had an interest in 
protecting its records and neither the broker nor the customer 
 
 248. Drake v. First Associated Sec. Grp., No. 95-03869, 1999 WL 1253565, 
at *2 (Jan. 15, 1999) (Bardack, Krotinger, & Mainardi, Arbs.). 
 249. See Bann v. First Associated Sec. Grp., No. 96-04601, 1999 WL 
1253604, at *3 (Jan. 15, 1999) (Gault, Goldberg, & McClaskey, Arbs.) (“The 
NASD shall expunge from its Central Registration Depository (CRD) records 
maintained for stipulating Respondents Carl Martellaro, Larry Miller, Jay 
Dugan and First Securities USA, all references to this claim.”). 
 250. In 2014, FINRA prohibited member firms from conditioning any 
settlement offer on a customer agreeing not to oppose the expungement of 
complaint information. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Notice to Members 14-31 
Expungement of Customer Dispute Information 4 (July 2014), https://
perma.cc/3R5A-B2N9 (PDF).  
 251. See Lazaro, supra note 234, at 139–46 (describing state efforts to 
intervene to stop courts from confirming awards recommending 
expungement). 
 252. Karsner v. Lothian, 532 F.3d 876, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 253. Id. at 881. 
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“represents the Commissioner's interest in protecting the 
integrity of the CRD.”254  
States still struggled to block the confirmation of stipulated 
awards. Some courts confirmed expungement awards over state 
opposition.255 For example, New York unsuccessfully sought to 
intervene and oppose an expungement arising out of a 
stipulated award in Kay v. Abrams.256 There, the broker had 
paid $155,000 to secure a stipulated award providing “for 
confidentiality and expungement of the matter from CRD 
records.”257 The court confirmed the award because it felt bound 
by precedent that it lacked authority to set aside the award 
because a New York appellate court had reversed a prior trial 
court for refusing to confirm an expungement.258 Generally, 
New York’s attempts to intervene were unsuccessful because 
the New York courts generally “viewed their role in the 
expungement controversy as highly limited, rejecting the policy 
arguments made by the Attorney General.”259 
Still, the efforts brought attention to significant concerns 
with how arbitration rules facilitated expungement. One court 
highlighted real issues with the stipulated award process by 
focusing on the award before her.260 The court explained that 
 
 254. Id. at 885–86. 
 255. See, e.g., Walker v. Connelly, 21 Misc. 3d 1123(A), at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Oct. 16, 2008) (“The Attorney General opposes confirmation of the stipulated 
award pursuant to CPLR 7511(b) on the grounds that the panel ‘exceeded its 
authority.’”). 
 256. See Kay v. Abrams, 853 N.Y.S.2d 862, 867 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (“[S]ince no 
basis has been alleged to deny confirmation, other than the legal arguments 
of the Attorney General referred to above, petitioner’s motion to confirm the 
Award is granted. In light of the foregoing, the application of the Attorney 
General to intervene is denied.”). 
 257. Id. at 863. 
 258. Id. at 866–67 (citing Goldstein v. Preisler, 805 N.Y.S.2d 647 (App. 
Div. 2005)) (“Although the then Attorney General did not seek to intervene in 
that case, since it is on ‘all fours’ with the case at bar and there is no contrary 
First Department decision, the court feels bound by the determination 
therein.”). 
 259. Lipner, supra note 91, at 80. 
 260. See In re Sage, Rutty, & Co. v. Salzberg, No. 2007-01942, slip op. at 
4–5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 1, 2007) (order granting partial rehearing) (“A hearing 
was never conducted, no written settlement agreement was ever drafted, and 
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“there are aspects of the [s]tipulated [a]ward which trouble the 
[c]ourt. The arbitrators found that (certain) claims were 
factually impossible or clearly erroneous, but there is not a 
single fact or circumstance described upon which the arbitrators 
base this conclusion.”261  
Concerns about an arbitration-facilitated expungement 
process grew. One review of 200 stipulated or settled arbitration 
awards in 2006 found arbitrators regularly granted 
expungement without conducting any affirmative fact 
finding.262 On the whole, arbitrators granted expungement 
requests after settlements 98 percent of the time.263 The 
arbitrators conducted no fact-based hearings 71 percent of the 
time.264 The troubling statistics revealed that decisions to 
expunge information from public records were being made 
without fully informed arbitrators. As one law professor noted, 
arbitrators were not considering “the larger policy implications 
and considerations associated with an effective CRD system.”265  
In many cases, arbitrators were simply ordering “expungement 
at the request of a party to facilitate settlement of a dispute.”266 
After some negative publicity, FINRA moved in 2008 to 
make changes to its code. It added Rules 12805 and 13805 to 
require arbitrators to hold at least one hearing session and 
 
no other documents were submitted. In that sense, the arbitrators’ decision on 
expungement is irrational because it was made without any evidentiary 
support.”). 
 261. Id. at 4. 
 262. See PUB. INV’RS ARB. BAR ASS’N, STUDY OF STIPULATED OR SETTLED 
NASD CUSTOMER AWARDS, ISSUED IN CALENDAR YEAR 2006, FOR WHICH 
STATEMENTS OF CLAIM WERE FILED ON, OR SUBSEQUENT TO, APRIL 12, 2004, 14 
(2007), https://perma.cc/A7A3-NZNN (PDF) (reviewing these awards).  
 263. Id. 
 264. Id.  
 265. Letter from Barbara Black, Charles Hartsock Professor of Law, Dir. 
of Corp. Law Ctr., Univ. of Cincinnati, to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n 2 (Apr. 24, 2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 266. Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change Amending the Codes of 
Arbitration Procedure to Establish Procedures for Arbitrators to Follow When 
Considering Requests for Expungement Relief, 73 Fed. Reg. 66,086, 66,087 
(Nov. 6, 2008). 
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explain the basis for their expungement recommendations.267 
These new rules effectively ended stipulated awards but left the 
underlying incentives unchanged. 
2. Purchasing Perjury & Silence 
Brokers had also found other ways to ensure that 
arbitration panels would approve requests for expungements. 
Brokers ensured one-sided expungement hearings and evidence 
by conditioning settlement offers on a customer either agreeing 
to support an expungement with a sworn affidavit saying the 
underlying complaint was false, or at least an agreement not to 
oppose a broker’s request.268 FINRA took repeated steps to 
address the issue. In 2004, FINRA warned industry members 
that “affidavits, attested to in connection with settlements that 
often are incorporated into stipulated awards, appear to be 
inconsistent on their face with the initial claim and terms of the 
settlement.”269 FINRA explained that members may face 
discipline if they submitted “affidavits in which the content is 
the product of a bargained-for consideration as opposed to the 
truth.”270 Obtaining expungements with bargained-for evidence 
undercuts the requirement that arbitrators have some 
 
 267. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to 
Amendments to the Codes of Arbitration Procedure to Establish New 
Procedures for Arbitrators to Follow When Considering Requests for 
Expungement Relief, Fed. Reg. 18,308, 18,308 (Apr. 3, 2008) (“The procedures 
are designed to: (1) make sure that arbitrators have the opportunity to 
consider the facts that support or weigh against a decision to grant 
expungement; and (2) ensure that expungement occurs only when the 
arbitrators find and document one of the narrow grounds specified in Rule 
2130.”). 
 268. See Melanie S. Cherdack, Drafting A Securities Arbitration Claim: 
The Pen Is (Still) Mightier Than the Market, 18 PIABA B.J. 333, 342 (2011) 
(explaining that for claimant’s counsel “[n]aming the individual broker may 
have benefits, too . . . . If, for instance, the broker is a big producer and 
important to the firm, the firm may have some incentive to settle the action 
and seek your client’s cooperation . . . .”). 
 269. See Nat. Ass’n Secs. Dealers, Notice to Members 04-43 Members’ Use 
of Affidavits in Connection with Stipulated Awards and Settlements to Obtain 
Expungement of Customer Dispute Information 554 (June 2004), https://
perma.cc/2H7C-F7M6 (PDF) (warning against procuring false affidavits).  
 270. Id. 
  
1106 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053 (2020) 
 
affirmative basis for recommending an expungement.271 In 
effect, the practice of requiring customers to swear to affidavits 
attesting that their initial claim was “false” may have amounted 
to purchasing perjury.  
Despite the warning, brokers continued to negotiate for 
customers to assist with, or at least not oppose, their 
expungement requests as a settlement condition until 2014 
when FINRA updated its rules to prohibit the practice. 272 In 
adopting the rule, FINRA explained that it believed the new 
rule would “ensure that information is expunged from the CRD 
system only when there is an independent judicial or arbitral 
decision that expungement is appropriate”273  
As often happens, new problems arise after regulators 
address old ones.274 The NASD prohibited the use of affidavits 
in 2004, ended stipulated awards in 2008, and explicitly 
prohibited negotiations over nonparticipation in expungements 
in 2014.275 In response to these changes, many brokers began to 
seek expungements in separate arbitrations naming their 
current or former employers as respondents. A report from the 
PIABA Foundation found that there has been an “explosive 
 
 271. See Scott Ilgenfritz, Expungement Study of the Public Investors 
Arbitration Bar Association, 20 PIABA B.J. 339, 349 (2013) (“Bargaining for 
such an affidavit from a customer claimant could clearly result in the ‘buying 
of a clean record’ and would make a mockery of any ‘affirmative determination’ 
of one of the three grounds in Rule 2130 by a panel of arbitrators.”). 
 272. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 2081 (2014) (prohibiting brokers 
and firms from conditioning “settlement of a dispute with a customer on, or to 
otherwise compensate the customer for, the customer’s agreement to consent 
to, or not to oppose, the member’s or associated person’s request to expunge 
such customer dispute information from the CRD system”). 
 273. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Reg. Notice 14–31 Expungement of Customer 
Dispute Information 2 (July 2014), https://perma.cc/Q4MN-2S2Q (PDF). 
 274. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in 
Financial Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. S351, S351 (2014) (explaining that in 
the “financial sector, however, the system that generates costs and benefits is 
constructed by financial regulation itself and the subsequent processes of 
adaptation and regulatory arbitrage. An important new rule will change the 
system beyond our calculative powers”). 
 275. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 2081 (2014) (“Rule 2081 removes 
the ability of parties to a customer arbitration to bargain for expungement 
relief as part of a settlement negotiation.”). 
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increase” in these “expungement-only” arbitrations, rising 924 
percent from 2015 to 2018.276 
E. Uninformed Decisions 
Ultimately, the current system for arbitration-facilitated 
expungements reveals that arbitrations now regularly occur 
where no party has any real incentive to bring pertinent, 
material information to the attention of arbitrators if that 
information would diminish the odds that an arbitrator will 
grant an expungement request. Courts asked to confirm these 
arbitration awards should not have any confidence that the 
arbitrators made a well-informed decision. Although the 
arbitrators may hear all the evidence presented to them, they 
usually hear no more than what the broker seeking an 
expungement wants them to hear. 
Consider an arbitration award directing expungement 
obtained by Patrick James Dwyer, a broker who once managed 
billions of dollars in assets.277 Dwyer secured an arbitration 
award recommending the expungement of six different 
customer complaints in two hearing sessions conducted on the 
same day. 278  His employer, Merrill Lynch, did not oppose the 
expungement request and indicated that it “agreed that a 
finding should be entered by the Panel in favor of” the 
expungement request.279 Of the six complaining customers, only 
three of them received any form of notice.280 Dwyer’s counsel 
took the position “that the notification requirements of an 
expungement request applies to customers who have filed for 
 
 276. DOSS & BRAGANÇA, supra note 88, at 3. 
 277. See Braswell & Horowitz, supra note 147 (reporting that Dwyer “led 
a 12-person team that managed some $3.7 billion and generated over $10 
million of annual revenue, left this week while under review”). 
 278. See In re Dwyer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., No. 
16-02781, 2017 WL 3189311, at *6 (July 20, 2017) (Ainbinder, Arb.) (noting 
that Plaintiff’s requested relief was the expungement of all records of these 
occurrences). 
 279. Id. at *1. 
 280. See id. (“Claimant provided notice of this proceeding to the only 
customer who filed for arbitration . . . . Claimant also provided notice to two 
other customers and they or their counsel gave written authority to not oppose 
nor support Claimant’s request for expungement . . . .”). 
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arbitration.”281 Because some of the complaining customers had 
never filed an arbitration complaint against Dwyer, he did not 
notify them of the expungement hearing at all.282 Hearing no 
objections from customers, some of whom had not even been told 
about the hearing, the arbitration panel agreed.283 The panel 
noted as significant the fact that his employer supported the 
request.284 The panel trusted Merrill Lynch to faithfully defend 
the integrity of the CRD because Merrill Lynch, as Dwyer’s 
employer, also had “a duty to protect the investing public and 
the firm’s customers from improper, fraudulent or otherwise 
culpable conduct.”285 
But the arbitration panel did not hear the complete story. 
FINRA sought to vacate the award in a Florida state court, 
contending that Dwyer had fraudulently concealed information 
from the arbitration panel and exhibited an “extreme lack of 
candor” in the arbitration proceeding.286 Dwyer, a Miami-based 
broker, had previously filed an action against FINRA in a 
California court seeking to force FINRA to expunge information 
from the CRD.287 Although his name eventually emerged as the 
broker behind the request, Dwyer had filed his California suit 
under a pseudonym. He may have sought relief in court first 
under the pseudonym to avoid the publicity that would follow 
 
 281. See id. (“Claimant’s counsel advised the Panel that it was his position 
that the notification requirements of an expungement request applies to 
customers who have filed for arbitration. The Panel agrees with Claimant’s 
counsel’s position.”). 
 282. See id. (noting that despite the fact that only one customer had filed 
an arbitration, Dwyer’s counsel represented that he had secured some written 
statement of some kind from two other complaining customers that they would 
not oppose the expungement request). 
 283. See id. at *2 (recommending expungement). 
 284. See id. (“Critical facts regarding the Focus 20 Fund were not 
contradicted by Respondent’s representative.”). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award at ¶¶ 9–10, Fin. Indus. Reg. 
Auth., Inc. v. Dwyer, No. 2017-023398-CA-01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2017), Dkt. No. 3.  
 287. See id. at Exhibit B (filing under the pseudonym John Doe). 
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when a broker with his multibillion-dollar book of business won 
an expungement.288  
Yet once Dwyer named FINRA as a defendant in a court 
action, FINRA contested the case and won, securing a post-trial 
decision denying Dwyer’s request to have information expunged 
from the CRD database.289 After adversarial litigation, the 
California court found that Dwyer “presented no evidence to 
show that any of these complaints are false, inaccurate, 
meritless or frivolous” and that the “disclosure of accurate 
customer dispute information is most definitely in the public 
interest.”290 The California court concluded that the “equities 
weigh heavily against expungement of Plaintiff Dwyer’s 
record.”291  The California court was presented with evidence 
and information that Dwyer, Dwyer’s counsel, and Merrill 
Lynch declined to provide to the arbitration panel. 
Ultimately, the Florida court considering vacating the 
arbitration award recommending expungement never ruled on 
the propriety of Dwyer’s behavior. On November 15, 2018, the 
parties presented the court with a joint stipulation of 
dismissal.292 It stipulated that Dwyer’s Petition to Confirm the 
Arbitration Award was “dismissed with prejudice.”293 Thus, 
FINRA succeeded at keeping the customer dispute information 
on the CRD system. 
Dwyer may have failed in his expungement attempt 
because he went to court first and faced FINRA as an actual 
adversary. If he had proceeded through arbitration first against 
his employer, FINRA likely would not have sought to block the 
confirmation of Dwyer’s award—or had a clear ground to do so. 
 
 288. See, e.g., Star Merrill PBIG Broker Sweeps His Record Nearly Clean, 
ADVISORHUB (July 21, 2017), https://perma.cc/HN22-L722 (reporting on 
Dwyer’s expungement award). 
 289. See Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award, supra note 286, at 28, Ex. 
B (“This is not a close case. The equities weigh heavily against expungement 
of Plaintiff Dwyer’s record.”). 
 290. Id. at 27–28. 
 291. Id. at 28. 
 292. See Stipulation to Dismissal with Prejudice, Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., 
Inc. v. Dwyer, No. 2017-023398-CA-01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2017), Dkt. No. 56 
(stipulating to a dismissal with prejudice of Dwyer’s petition to confirm the 
arbitration award).  
 293. Id. 
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Under Rule 2080, FINRA must be named as a defendant in 
court actions unless FINRA waives the requirements under 
Rule 2080.294 If Dwyer had obtained affirmative arbitral 
findings first, FINRA might have waived the requirement to 
name it as a party or chosen not to contest the expungement 
because no strong rationale for opposing the individual 
arbitration award seems readily apparent. The process 
effectively leaves it up to the parties and the rare customer to 
present arbitrators with pertinent, material facts. 
III. Interventions 
Some interventions may address, or at least mitigate 
adversarial failure. The best solution, discussed in the next 
subpart, would be to simply remove expungement and other 
matters with a high degree of adversarial failure from 
adversarial systems entirely. Absent that, process-oriented 
changes and ethics-focused interventions might address the 
issue to some degree. 
Ultimately, adversarial failure occurs whenever the parties 
to an action have no real incentive to present information to an 
adjudicator. In these situations, courts, regulators, and 
legislators should not assume that an adjudicator made an 
informed decision because no party had any real incentive to 
present the adjudicator with complete information. Adversarial 
failure may often be a matter of degree. In some instances, a 
disparity of resources or advocate skill and diligence may 
generate the same results. 
A. Moving Away from Adversarial Adjudication 
In most instances, it may be better to simply abandon 
adversarial adjudication in favor of some alternative approach. 
Barbara Black suggested this type of shift in 2008, explaining 
that “the integrity of the CRD is such an important and integral 
part of an effective investor education and protection system 
that only the regulators whose responsibilities include, first and 
 
 294. See FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH., RULE 2080 (2009) (“Members or 
associated persons petitioning a court for expungement relief . . . must name 
FINRA as an additional party . . . unless this requirement is waived.”). 
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foremost, protection of the investing public should make 
decisions about removing information from the record.”295 Black 
also recognized that arbitration may be particularly ill-suited to 
this task because the “arbitrators’ mission . . . does not include 
consideration of the larger policy implications and 
considerations associated with an effective CRD system.”296 
For expungement processes, the interests of all 
stakeholders may be better balanced by removing the entire 
process from an adversarial system. When the parties to an 
action do not have real incentives to fully inform an adjudicator, 
society should not resolve issues by routing them through a 
phony adversarial process and then roping courts in to confirm 
the results. 
Gaming regulation may provide a rough, workable model 
for effectively policing the CRD system’s integrity. Consider how 
Nevada approaches gaming licenses. Lawyers and enrolled 
agents who practice before the Nevada gaming regulators 
operate within a demanding regulatory framework. When a 
lawyer appears on a client’s behalf before the Nevada Gaming 
and Control Board, “the person represented [is] deemed to have 
waived all privileges with respect to any information in the 
possession of such attorney.”297 The gaming regulators also 
require attorneys practicing before them to be expansively 
candid, explaining that they “shall not be intentionally 
untruthful to the board or commission, nor withhold from the 
board or commission any information which the board or 
commission is entitled to receive.”298 These obligations also 
include a duty to investigate before appearing and instruct that 
attorneys appearing before gaming regulators “shall exercise 
due diligence in preparing or assisting in the preparation of 
documents for submission to the board or commission.”299 The 
regulations place continuing obligations on attorneys appearing 
 
 295. Black, supra note 265, at 2. 
 296. Id. 
 297. NEV. GAMING REG. § 10.080 (2017). 
 298. Id. § 10.090(1). 
 299. Id. § 10.090(2). 
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before the board to update any information that is “no longer 
accurate and complete in any material respect.”300  
Gaming regulators make the lawyers appearing before 
them function as gatekeepers.301  A lawyer may be banned from 
practicing before the gaming regulators if she “willfully failed to 
exercise diligence in the preparation or presentation” materials 
or “knowingly misrepresented any material fact to the board or 
commission.”302 In effect, an attorney may lose her right to 
practice before the regulator if she fails to discover readily 
available information. Bad faith behavior or simple ineptitude 
may also result in exclusion.303 
But the attorneys do not serve as the only gatekeepers. 
Importantly, gaming regulators do not rely entirely upon these 
expansive disclosure requirements or expect attorneys and 
applicants to surface all information on their own. They 
independently investigate persons who apply for a gaming 
license and may even bill applicants for the costs incurred in 
conducting an investigation.304  
An appropriate gatekeeper model may greatly improve the 
process. Securities regulators already have substantial 
familiarity with gatekeeping.305 The securities laws impose 
gatekeeping liability on underwriters in an effort to improve the 
quality of information investors receive.306 Underwriters put 
 
 300. Id. § 10.090(3). 
 301. Professor Coffee defines “gatekeeper” as “a reputational intermediary 
who provides verification or certification services to investors.” John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant 
Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 309 (2004). 
 302. NEV. GAMING REG. § 10.065(2)(b) (2017). 
 303. Id. § 10.025(2)(d) (allowing exclusion if a person lacks “requisite 
qualifications or expertise to represent others before the board or commission, 
lacks character or integrity, or has engaged in unethical or improper conduct”). 
 304. See id. § 4.070 (“[T]he Board may require an applicant to pay such 
supplementary investigative fees and costs as may be determined by the 
Board.”). 
 305. See Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to 
Professor Coffee, 84 B.U. L. REV. 365, 367 (2004) (“Professor Coffee and I both 
support a strict liability regime for gatekeepers, not a negligence regime.”). 
 306. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the 
SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293, 1297 (2003) (“The underwriter in an initial 
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their capital and reputations on the line when selling securities. 
In contrast, arbitrators are not well-situated to serve as key 
gatekeepers here. They face no liability for any failure, and they 
lack real incentives and tools to gather information necessary to 
make an informed decision. If anything, a reputation for close 
scrutiny may reduce the likelihood that an arbitrator will even 
be selected. Fundamentally, arbitrators should not serve as the 
key gatekeepers in this context. 
A regulatory model for resolving these types of disputes 
would likely yield better informed decisions. As an independent, 
self-regulatory organization, FINRA could transition its 
involvement in the expungement process from passively 
operating an arbitration forum to a more significant 
gatekeeping role.  Some regulatory process akin to the method 
Nevada uses to vet applicants for gaming licenses might serve 
as a rough model for a process through which FINRA could 
better balance the key interests at stake here, allowing brokers 
to contest and remove provably false information while 
protecting the integrity of information within the CRD.  
A well-constituted committee could manage this process. A 
committee could incorporate relevant stakeholders including 
state securities regulators, investor advocates, and brokerage 
firms. Channeling all expungement requests through a single 
committee instead of a rotating cast of arbitrators would allow 
for a more regularized process to develop. Importantly, the 
committee would accumulate experience resolving these issues 
much more rapidly than a broadly dispersed pool of arbitrators. 
A committee could also hire counsel, investigators, and others 
to help surface information relevant to the committee’s decision. 
This would allow the committee to avoid total dependence on a 
requesting party’s willingness to provide information. 
B. Changes to Attorney Ethics Rules 
Professional ethics rules shape how attorneys present 
information to adjudicators when advocating for their clients. In 
most states, the ethical rules governing law practice generally 
 
public offering also performs a gatekeeping function, in the sense that its 
reputation is implicitly pledged and it is expected to perform due diligence 
services.”). 
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track the ethics rules and policies promulgated by the American 
Bar Association (ABA).307 As the lawyers elected to the ABA 
House of Delegates have obligations to their own clients, the 
lawyers collaborating to generate these rules “likely have direct 
financial interest in the rules that they draft.”308   
Our adversarial system of justice implicitly assumes 
tribunals will reach informed decisions because each side will 
investigate the matter and bring forward facts relevant to the 
dispute.309 In theory, clashing parties will hold each other 
accountable and point out any errors, allowing adjudicators to 
reach informed decisions.310 This idyllic vision does not match 
reality.311 As explained below, the current ethics rules grant 
lawyers broad flexibility to frame factual scenarios in their 
clients’ interest without cluing courts or arbitrators in to all 
relevant information. 
1. Existing Rules Treat Law and Fact Differently 
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct treat legal 
arguments and factual presentations differently, often allowing 
lawyers to withhold adverse relevant facts from a tribunal as 
long as they disclose governing law.312 ABA Model Rule 3.3, 
which speaks to a lawyer’s duty of candor, treats a failure to 
 
 307. See Renee Newman Knake, The Legal Monopoly, 93 WASH. L. REV. 
1293, 1298 (2018) (“Most states draw from model ethics rules and policies 
promulgated by lawyers elected by their peers to the American Bar 
Association (‘ABA’) House of Delegates.”). 
 308. Id. 
 309. I use the word “tribunal” here to track the ethics rules and because it 
also encompasses disputes resolved by an arbitrator. 
 310. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT PREAMBLE ¶ 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2020) (“When an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous 
advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being 
done.”). 
 311. See Daniel Markovits, Adversary Advocacy and the Authority of 
Adjudication, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2006) (explaining that the 
general assumption that the adversarial system will on balance generate the 
best results has “been shown to be not just mistaken but simply implausible. 
To begin with, its factual predicates do not generally obtain.”). 
 312. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 111 cmt. 
c. (AM. LAW. INST. 2000) (pointing out that that “it is sometimes argued that 
the rule . . . it draws a dubious distinction between legal authority and facts”). 
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disclose pertinent, adverse legal authority differently from a 
failure to disclose pertinent, adverse facts.313  
a. Governing Law 
ABA Model Rule 3.3(a)(2) prohibits lawyers from knowingly 
failing to disclose “legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction 
known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the 
client and not disclosed by opposing counsel.”314 The official 
comment to the rule explains that “[t]he underlying concept is 
that legal argument is a discussion seeking to determine the 
legal premises properly applicable to the case.”315 In essence, the 
ethics rule sometimes requires a lawyer to carry the discussion 
into legal territory she might prefer to avoid—even if the lawyer 
on the other side of the case does not raise the precedent.316 
The expectation that lawyers will not knowingly withhold 
information about relevant past precedents has long been part 
of the American legal system.317 Alabama included 
requirements to not knowingly cite “as authority an overruled 
case” or not “knowingly misquoting the language of a decision” 
in the Alabama Code of Ethics of 1887.318 The Restatement also 
embraces this view and makes clear that a lawyer “may not 
knowingly . . . fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in 
the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly 
 
 313. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (2020) (distinguishing 
between the two). 
 314. Id. at (a)(2). 
 315. Id. at cmt. 4. 
 316. See Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 
146 (1935) (explaining that a precedent-disclosing lawyer “may, of course, 
after doing so, challenge the soundness of the decisions or present reasons 
which he believes would warrant the court in not following them in the 
pending case”). 
 317. See Andrea Pin & Francesca M. Genova, The Duty to Disclose Adverse 
Precedents: The Spirit of the Common Law and Its Enemies, 44 YALE J. INT’L 
L. 239, 256 (2019) (tracing the origin on the rule). 
 318. CODE OF ETHICS OF THE ALA. STATE BAR ASS’N r. 5 (1887), reprinted in 
ALA. STATE BAR ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF 
THE ALA. STATE BAR ASS’N 336 (1918). 
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adverse to the position asserted by the client and not disclosed 
by opposing counsel.”319 
Courts have reacted harshly to lawyers who fail to present 
relevant, adverse legal authority when arguing for their clients. 
Most famously, Judge Posner published an opinion directing a 
stinging rebuke at one lawyer for failing to cite relevant 
authority.320 After the lawyer repeatedly failed to address a 
particular case, the opinion compared the lawyer to an ostrich, 
explaining that the “ostrich is a noble animal, but not a proper 
model for an appellate advocate.”321 Capturing additional 
attention, the opinion includes two photographs, one with an 
ostrich burying its head in the sand and another with a figure 
clad in a tan business suit in a similar posture.322  
b. Factual Presentations 
In contrast, the Model Rules and ethical norms do not 
usually require lawyers to disclose adverse factual information. 
Instead, the model rule instructs that a lawyer “shall not 
knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to the 
tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or 
law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.”323 The 
Restatement also follows this approach and prohibits lawyers 
from offering testimony the lawyers knows to be false.324  
 
 319. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 111(2) (AM. 
LAW. INST. 2000). 
 320. See Gonzalez-Servin v. Ford Motor Co., 662 F.3d 931, 934 (7th Cir. 
2011) (“When there is apparently dispositive precedent, an appellant may urge 
its overruling or distinguishing or reserve a challenge to it for a petition for 
certiorari but may not simply ignore it.”). 
 321. Id.  
 322. Id. at 935. Notably, the rebuke itself may have been an ethical breach 
for Judge Posner. See Joseph P. Mastrosimone, Benchslaps, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 
331, 352 (2017) (criticizing so-called benchslaps because “[i]nstead of meeting 
the attorney’s unprofessional or unethical conduct with dispassionate and 
professional counseling or sanctions, the judges in these benchslaps . . . use[d] 
their authority to shame and belittle the lawyers”). 
 323. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 324. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 (AM. 
LAW. INST. 2000) (prohibiting lawyers from offering false facts or testimony to 
the tribunal). 
  
ADVERSARIAL FAILURE  1117 
 
c. The Knowledge Qualifier 
A lawyer’s ethical obligations within this framework shift 
once the lawyer has knowledge that some evidence or factual 
information is false. The knowledge qualifier grants substantial 
flexibility and even allows lawyers to present information they 
believe to be false. The Model Rules define “knowledge” as 
“actual knowledge of the fact in question,” with the addition that 
“[a] person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.”325 
 In discussing the ABA’s Model Rule, the official comment 
explains that the “prohibition against offering false evidence 
only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. Even 
a lawyer’s reasonable belief that evidence is false does not 
preclude its presentation to the trier of fact.”326 
Substantial justification undergirds this rule. Lawyers 
practice with limited information and may not be able to 
actually know whether a client’s account actually transpired or 
was simply fabricated. If lawyers could not present a client’s 
version of events simply because the lawyer harbored some 
doubts, it would substantially interfere with a client’s ability to 
obtain assistance.  
Doubting lawyers do not always need to investigate dubious 
factual claims. A comment to the Model Rule instructs lawyers 
to “resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other 
evidence in favor of the client.”327 The ethics rules do not 
explicitly require lawyers to make any attempt to put their 
doubts to rest before offering evidence they believe may be 
false.328 Although the comment to the Model Rule indicates that 
a lawyer may not “ignore an obvious falsehood,” in most practice 
situations, lawyers have no clear ethical obligation to 
investigate their client’s factual claims or search for evidence 
which would show that a client has given a false factual 
 
 325. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1(f) (2020). 
 326. Id. r. 3.3 cmt. 8 (2020). 
 327. Id. 
 328. See George M. Cohen, The State of Lawyer Knowledge Under the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 3 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 115, 117 (2014) 
(“The actual knowledge standard aims to exclude a duty to inquire.”). 
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account.329 George Cohen characterized the “knowledge” 
qualifier as a “key marker in a contentious struggle over the 
scope of a lawyer’s duty to investigate.”330 The ethics rules only 
create clear liability for lawyers issuing reckless statements 
about “the qualifications or integrity of a judge, adjudicatory 
officer or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or 
appointment to judicial or legal office.”331  
In some instances, lawyers may decide that they would 
rather not investigate and know the truth because knowing the 
truth might impair their ability to advocate for a client.332 
George Cohen explains that “a lawyer faced with a suspicious 
fact” might reason that “investigating would be a bad idea 
because that would put the lawyer at risk of violating the 
knowledge-based rule.”333 Of course, for lawyers practicing in 
federal court, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) provide 
a limited check. FRCP Rule 11 forces lawyers submitting papers 
to a court to certify that a lawyer conducted “an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances.”334 The requirement does 
not force a lawyer to certify that she believes a contention to be 
true, so much as “the factual contentions have evidentiary 
support.”335 In some instances, this evidentiary support may 
simply be a client’s doubtful claims. 
 
 329. See id. at 125 (“Thus, a lawyer faced with a suspicious fact that is not 
sufficient along with other circumstances to impart actual knowledge need not 
do anything further.”). 
 330. Id. at 124. 
 331. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.2(a) (2020). 
 332. Duties of inquiry do exist in some practice areas. In transactional 
securities practice, lawyers and other professionals have long faced a duty to 
inquire. See Cohen, supra note 328, at 118 (“Transactional lawyers in 
particular are familiar with the recklessness standard because it plays an 
important role in securities fraud and other business crimes and torts.”). 
Lawyers must also make inquiries when preparing opinion letters. See, e.g., 
Excalibur Oil, Inc. v. Sullivan, 616 F. Supp. 458, 463 (N.D. Ill. 1985) 
(“Necessarily implicit in any [opinion letter] contract is the lawyer’s duty to 
investigate the title with reasonable diligence and to report his findings 
accurately.”). 
 333. Cohen, supra note 328, at 125. 
 334. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 335. Id. (b)(3). 
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d. A Limited Duty to Correct 
Under the ethics rules, lawyers owe only a limited 
obligation to inform a tribunal when they know that false 
evidence has been presented to it. The ABA’s Model Rules only 
explicitly require lawyers to take “remedial measures, 
including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal” when a 
lawyer learns that she, her client, or a witness she called offered 
material evidence she later came to know was false.336 The 
Restatement takes the view that lawyers have “no responsibility 
to correct false testimony or other evidence offered by an 
opposing party or witness.”337  
Lawyers do owe an obligation to the tribunal to correct false 
information when they have had some hand in presenting the 
information to the tribunal. The Restatement explains that even 
if it would hurt a client’s interests, a lawyer must correct false 
information she had some role in presenting because 
“preservation of the integrity of the forum is a superior 
interest.”338 
e. Undisclosed Vital Factual Evidence 
In most situations, ethics rules do not obligate lawyers to 
provide tribunals or opposing counsel with all, significant, 
material information in their possession.339 The ethics rules do 
not generally require lawyers to volunteer accurate information 
vital to developing an informed understanding of a dispute.340 
 
 336. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 337. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt. d. 
(2000) (“[A] plaintiff’s lawyer, aware that an adverse witness being examined 
by the defendant’s lawyer is giving false evidence favorable to the plaintiff, is 
not required to correct it . . . .”). 
 338. Id. cmt. b. 
 339. See Nathan M. Crystal, Limitations on Zealous Representation in an 
Adversarial System, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 671, 715 (1997) (“It is a 
well-established doctrine that lawyers have no obligation to disclose 
voluntarily . . . to opposing parties or to the tribunal evidence that is material 
to the case, even if nondisclosure would produce a result that is inconsistent 
with the truth.”). 
 340. See John A. Humbach, Shifting Paradigms of Lawyer Honesty, 76 
TENN. L. REV. 993, 1013 (2009) (“[I]t is a professional truism of current 
American legal practice that a lawyer has no general duty to volunteer.”). 
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The ABA has even issued a formal ethics opinion that lawyers 
may violate the ethics rules if they inform opposing counsel that 
the statute of limitations has run on a claim because it would 
violate their duties to their client.341 At the most, the comment 
to the ABA ethics rule recognizes that some circumstances exist 
“where failure to make a disclosure is the equivalent of an 
affirmative misrepresentation.”342  
Some courts have found “failure to make disclosure of a 
material fact to a tribunal is the equivalent of affirmative 
misrepresentation.”343 New Jersey goes further than most 
states and requires lawyers to disclose unprivileged or 
otherwise unprotected material facts if a court would otherwise 
be misled by nondisclosure.344 These limited requirements leave 
substantial room for error. 
Yet tribunals often fail to receive information vital to 
developing a well-informed understanding of a dispute—even 
when the information is known to one or all of the parties to a 
dispute.345 Importantly, procedural, ethical, and economic 
constraints all shape the information tribunals actually 
receive.346  
 
 341. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-387 
(1994) (“[W]e conclude that a lawyer has no ethical duty to inform an opposing 
party that her client’s claim is time-barred; to the contrary, it may well be 
unethical to disclose such information without the client’s consent.”). 
 342. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
 343. AIG Haw. Ins. v. Bateman, 923 P.2d 395, 402 (Haw. 1996), amended 
on reconsideration in part, 925 P.2d 373 (Haw. 1996); see, e.g., In re Fee, 898 
P.2d 975, 979 (Ariz. 1995) (“The system cannot function as intended if 
attorneys, sworn officers of the court, can . . . mislead judges in the guise of 
serving their clients.”). 
 344. See N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(5) (2003) (prohibiting 
failure “to disclose to the tribunal a material fact knowing that the omission 
is reasonably certain to mislead the tribunal, except that it shall not be a 
breach of this rule if the disclosure is protected by a recognized privilege or is 
otherwise prohibited by law”). 
 345. See supra Part II.E. 
 346. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt. 
b. (2000) (“[An] advocate who knows of the evidence, and who has complied 
with applicable rules concerning pretrial discovery and other applicable 
disclosure requirements . . . has no legal obligation to reveal the evidence, 
even though the proceeding thereby may fail to ascertain the facts as the 
lawyer knows them.”). 
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In some instances, all parties to the litigation might prefer 
to avoid presenting courts with particular factual information 
or arguments. Lawyers after all tend to operate in the interests 
of their clients and not in the interest of helping a tribunal 
develop the most accurate understanding.347 This means that 
tribunals will proceed without important material information 
when it is not in any party’s interest to provide the information 
and the law does not compel disclosure. Adding to the problem, 
even when the ethics rules compel disclosure, attorneys will 
only rarely face any repercussion for failing to disclose.348 
f. Ex Parte Proceedings  
The ethics rules impose an expanded duty of candor on 
advocates in ex parte proceedings. The ABA’s Model Rules 
instruct that in an ex parte proceeding “a lawyer shall inform 
the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer that will 
enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or 
not the facts are adverse.”349  
The comment to the Model Rule explains why disclosure is 
required in ex parte proceedings. In an ordinary situation, “an 
advocate has the limited responsibility of presenting one side of 
the matters that a tribunal should consider in reaching a 
decision.”350 In our adversarial system, “the conflicting position 
is expected to be presented by the opposing party.”351 Yet in ex 
parte situations, such as a request for “a temporary restraining 
order, there is no balance of presentation by opposing 
advocates.”352 Despite this, the comment instructs that the 
 
 347. See Humbach, supra note 340, at 995 (“Lawyers do not generally view 
it as part of their professional role to be personally responsible for getting at 
the truth of the matter but, rather, to persuade others to believe or accept 
whatever interpretation of the raw evidence is most beneficial to the interests 
of their own clients.”).  
 348. See Edwards, supra note 29, at 1491 (“In many instances, state bars 
do not allocate substantial resources to their enforcement staff to investigate 
complaints.”). 
 349. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) 
(emphasis added). 
 350. Id. cmt. 14. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. 
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object of the proceeding “is nevertheless to yield a substantially 
just result.”353 To accomplish this goal, it requires a lawyer for 
the represented party “to make disclosures of material facts 
known to the lawyer and that the lawyer reasonably believes 
are necessary to an informed decision.”354 
In describing a lawyer’s ethical obligations in ex parte 
proceedings, the Restatement goes further and also prohibits 
lawyers from presenting “evidence the lawyer reasonably 
believes is false” and instructs lawyers to also comply with “any 
other applicable special requirements of candor imposed by 
law.”355 The comment recognizes that the “potential for abuse is 
inherent in applying to a tribunal in absence of an adversary.”356 
 Identifying the situations where a lawyer must operate 
under an expanded duty of candor remains challenging because 
the ABA’s Model Rules do not define ex parte proceedings.357 
Although technical definition would exclude all cases where 
some other party appears in the action, this would overly limit 
the rule’s impact. One Idaho court read Idaho’s rule as applying 
when one of the parties, after having received notice, failed to 
appear in a proceeding.358 It read the comment as suggesting 
“that the application of the rule is not meant to hinge on a 
technical definition of the term ex parte, but is instead intended 
to ensure that the tribunal is informed of facts necessary to 
render a just decision.”359 It found that the underlying rationale 
applied when “‘there is no balance of representation by opposing 
advocates’” applied when one of the parties was simply absent 
from a proceeding.360 
 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. 
 355. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 (2000). 
 356. Id. cmt. b. 
 357. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.0 (2020) (failing to define ex 
parte). 
 358. See In re Malmin v. Oths, 895 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Idaho 1995) (“The 
judge has an affirmative responsibility to accord the absent party just 
consideration.”). 
 359. Id. 
 360. Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 14 (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2020)). 
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Policy rationales support extending the requirement 
beyond purely technical situations. The Restatement recognizes 
that in some special proceedings, “public policy requires 
unusual candor from an advocate.”361 It identifies child custody 
proceedings, involuntary commitment proceedings, and class 
action settlement proceedings.362  
Massachusetts also treats class action settlement 
proceedings as quasi-ex parte proceedings requiring lawyers to 
be fully candid with the court. The comment to its ethics rule 
explains that when: 
[A]dversaries present a joint petition to a tribunal, such as a 
joint petition to approve the settlement of a class action suit 
or the settlement of a suit involving a minor, the proceeding 
loses its adversarial character and in some respects takes on 
the form of an ex parte proceeding.363 
The Massachusetts rule recently played a significant role in 
extended litigation arising out of a class action settlement before 
a Massachusetts federal court.364 After the court approved a 
large class action settlement deal, it emerged that “$4,100,000 
of the $75,000,000 fee award had been paid to Damon Chargois, 
a lawyer in Texas who had done no work on the case, and whose 
name was not disclosed to [the named plaintiff], the class, or the 
court.”365 Other problems emerged as well. Over 9,000 attorney 
hours had been double counted.366 It also appeared that 
attorneys were billed at rates in excess of what hourly clients 
ever paid.367 Troubled by the revelation, the court ultimately 
reduced class counsel’s fee award and explained the need for 
 
 361. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 112 cmt. c 
(2000). 
 362. Id. 
 363. MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3. cmt. 14A (2015). 
 364. For a more thorough discussion of the case, see Edwards & Rickey, 
supra note 39.  
 365. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Tr., 404 F. Supp. 3d 486, 
492 (D. Mass. 2018). 
 366. See id. at 499 (“[D]ouble-counting resulted in inflating the number of 
hours worked by more than 9,300.”). 
 367. See id. (“[S]taff attorneys involved in this case were typically paid 
$25–$40 an hour . . . . [T]he regular hourly billing rates for the staff attorneys 
were much higher—for example, $425.”). 
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complete candor in class action settlement hearings because 
“the adversary process does not operate and have the potential 
to expose misrepresentations.”368 
2. Expanded Duties 
The professional ethics rules governing attorney conduct 
assume that the attorney plays a defined role within a 
functioning adversarial system. Yet incentives sometimes align 
in ways that undercut this assumption within dispute 
resolution systems. Ethics authorities might address the gap by 
providing enhanced guidance for attorneys operating in these 
types of proceedings. A practical expansion may be 
accomplished by amendments to the ABA’s Model Rules or by 
individualized efforts by states to address the issue. State bar 
ethics opinions may also operate with some force to shift 
behavior. 
In circumstances where adversarial failure regularly 
occurs, professional ethics rules should clearly and 
unambiguously expand an attorney’s duties in ways designed to 
increase the likelihood that a tribunal will render a 
well-informed decision. An expanded disclosure duty may serve 
to increase the likelihood that a tribunal will render a 
reasonably informed decision. Practically, the duty must include 
two distinct parts, an expanded duty of candor accompanied by 
an affirmative obligation to investigate.  
a. An Expanded Duty of Candor 
Ethics authorities could respond to adversarial failure by 
requiring that attorneys operate under an expanded duty of 
candor in situations that resemble ex parte proceedings in 
substance, if not form. Massachusetts, at least, already 
embraces this premise with its official comment recognizing 
that when “adversaries present a joint petition to a tribunal, 
such as a joint petition to approve the settlement of a class 
action suit or the settlement of a suit involving a minor, the 
 
 368. Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. State St. Bank & Tr., No. 11-10230, 2020 
WL 949885, at *47 (D. Mass. Feb. 27, 2020). 
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proceeding loses its adversarial character and in some respects 
takes on the form of an ex parte proceeding.”369  
The same dynamic may apply whenever an adversary 
simply opts not to contest an application for relief. Consider the 
dynamic in expungement-only arbitrations brokers now file 
against their employers. From an adjudicator’s perspective, 
there may be little difference between a joint application and an 
uncontested one. In each case, the adjudicator hears no 
opposition and only views evidence from one party pushing it 
toward a single outcome. 
b. An Expanded Duty to Investigate 
Yet an expanded duty of candor alone will not suffice. To 
avoid speaking any evil, attorneys may simply opt to hear and 
see little other than what their client tells them. Tribunals 
should not be deprived of reasonably accessible information 
simply because a lawyer opts to shut her eyes to obvious lines of 
inquiry.  
A clear duty to conduct a reasonable investigation under the 
circumstances may address this issue. In instances where 
attorneys fail to disclose readily obtainable information to a 
tribunal, protestations that the attorney was not aware of the 
information should not remove all ethical liability.370 This 
obligation might reduce the incentive to seek expungements in 
cases where readily available public information undercuts a 
broker’s claims.   
c. Disclosure’s Limits 
Changes to attorney ethics rules may do some real good, but 
they certainly will not entirely solve the problems that flow from 
attempting to resolve these issues through processes designed 
for adversarial parties to resolve private disputes. 
Disclosure-oriented reforms have not always shifted actual 
 
 369. MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3. cmt. 14A (2015).  
 370. Cf. Cohen, supra note 328, at 148 (suggesting that the ABA “add a 
comment to the definition of knowledge stating that the knowledge 
requirement does not negate or limit any duty to investigate or communicate 
that otherwise exists, and that the deliberate breach of these duties can be 
evidence of willful blindness and therefore knowledge”). 
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conduct in adversarial proceeding.371 Even substantive 
disclosure requirements in securities class action litigation, 
requiring repeat plaintiffs to disclose prior litigation have not 
always generated expected disclosures.372 Expanded ethical 
guidance must be accompanied by some real enforcement 
pressure to be effective. 
Arbitration forums also present real challenges because the 
reach of attorney ethics rules may depend on the state. New 
York’s federal courts have found that representing a party in 
arbitration does not qualify as the practice of law.373 In contrast, 
California treats arbitration as part of the practice of law.374 
As an alternative to state-by-state ethics changes, FINRA 
could make rules applicable to all representative advocates 
appearing in expungement hearings. It could enforce these rules 
by suspending or permanently barring violators from pursuing 
expungement relief for clients within its forum. This might 
generate a significant incentive to disclose readily available 
information that would be contrary to an expungement request. 
As a number of firms specialize in pursuing expungement 
requests for clients, the threat of losing access to the forum 
would be significant enough to shift behavior.  
C. Adjudicator Responses 
1. An Appointed Advocate  
Adjudicators may also respond to adversarial failure by 
taking steps to restore adversarial scrutiny and increase the 
 
 371. See Edwards & Rickey, supra note 39, at 1566 (“Disclosure-based 
reforms, however, have a limited track record of success and are unlikely to be 
a panacea on their own.”). 
 372. See Jessica Erickson, The New Professional Plaintiffs in Shareholder 
Litigation, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1089, 1135 (2013) (discussing absent disclosures in 
securities class action litigation). 
 373. See Prudential Equity Grp. v. Ajamie, 538 F. Supp. 2d 605, 608 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (ruling that under New York law, arbitration does not qualify 
as the practice of law); see also Siegel v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera 
Indus. y Comercial, No. 90 CIV. 6108 (RJW), 1991 WL 167979, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 
Aug. 19, 1991) (same). 
 374. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank v. Super. Ct., 949 P.2d 
1, 9 (Cal. 1998) (declining “to craft an arbitration exception to section 6125’s 
prohibition of the unlicensed practice of law in this state”). 
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likelihood of an informed decision. This idea has been raised 
before. Special masters have been proposed as a response to 
defects in class action settlement approval processes with one 
justice suggesting appointing a “devil’s advocate” to raise 
arguments against class action fee arrangements.375 Delaware’s 
vaunted Chancery Courts have also considered recruiting 
assistances from an amicus curiae to overcome adversarial 
breakdown.376 The PIABA Foundation also suggested a reform 
in this vein, arguing that “FINRA and/or the SEC create an 
investor protection advocate (“Advocate”) that is independent 
from FINRA to participate in every Expungement-Only case.”377 
These ideas have real merit and may increase the likelihood 
that an adjudicator considering an expungement request will 
make a reasonably informed decision. At the very least, regular, 
experienced, and reasonably competent opposition would likely 
discourage some of the worst abuses.  
2. Greater Control Over Process 
Adjudicators could also take steps to mitigate adversarial 
failure by taking greater control over the process. Consider the 
benefits which might flow from adjudicators taking greater 
control over notice processes. At present, advocates enjoy 
substantial freedom to influence the notice process to increase 
the likelihood that they will receive favorable outcomes.378 An 
adjudicator focused on increasing participation and surfacing 
information would likely provide notice in a different way. 
 
 375. See Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l Inc., 376 P.3d 672, 691 (Cal. 2016) 
(Liu, J., concurring); see also William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: 
Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1475–77 
(2006) (arguing for a devil’s advocate to evaluate substantive settlements in 
class actions). 
 376. See In re Trulia, Inc. S’holder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 899 (Del. Ch. 2016) 
(“[I]t may be appropriate for the Court to appoint an amicus curiae to assist 
the Court in its evaluation of the alleged benefits of the supplemental 
disclosures, given the challenges posed by the non-adversarial nature of the 
typical disclosure settlement hearing.”). 
 377. DOSS & BRAGANÇA, supra note 88, at 10. 
 378. See Humbach, supra note 340, at 995 (“While telling lies is definitely 
out of bounds . . . trying to bend others’ perceptions to the client’s best 
advantage is seen to be at the heart of good advocacy.”). 
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Notices would be crafted to encourage participation. They would 
be distributed repeatedly and with a substantial lead time 
before any hearing. A notice aimed at increasing customer 
participation would direct recipients to relevant information 
about any available pro bono assistance. 
Improved processes would also distribute notice about the 
request more broadly to encompass all relevant stakeholders. 
State and federal regulators might opt to appear at the 
fact-finding stage if they were given notice and an invitation to 
participate. Investors with claims currently pending against a 
broker seeking an expungement might also opt to provide their 
perspectives and experiences with the broker. Essentially, 
adjudicators could shift the processes they use to solicit 
additional information in ways designed to encourage 
stakeholder participation. 
3. Eliminate Repeat Player Bias Risk 
In the expungement context, FINRA might attempt to 
eliminate the risk that arbitrators will favor industry interests 
in expungement hearings by removing the ability for parties to 
rank and strike arbitrators who hear expungement requests. To 
its credit, FINRA has considered and its board has approved a 
rule establishing a pool of arbitrators who receive additional 
trainings for expungements.379 As the rule proposal has not yet 
been filed with the SEC, the precise contours of the rule remain 
uncertain. 
A roster with additional training alone seems unlikely to 
substantially improve the process because selection effects will 
remain significant. The arbitrator selection process now allows 
brokers to cut known skeptics or arbitrators prone to asking too 
many probing questions from their list. As many 
expungement-only matters proceed without participation from 
parties with an interest in a skeptical arbitrator, the selection 
 
 379. See Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., Reg. Notice 17–42 Expungement of 
Customer Dispute Information 5 (Dec. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/HB2Z-YAV3 
(PDF) (requesting comments on the proposed changes); see also FIN. INDUS. 
REG. AUTH., UPDATE: FINRA BD. OF GOVERNORS MEETING (Oct. 3, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/ETT5-5S5W (noting that the Board had approved the 
proposed changes). 
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pressures strongly favor arbitrators who routinely grant 
expungement requests. Removing the ability to rank and strike 
arbitrators in expungement matters would substantially 
mitigate this risk. 
Importantly, the arbitrator roster for expungement matters 
should serve exclusively on expungement matters. Maintaining 
a limited, exclusive pool would generate real benefits. With a 
smaller pool, the overall cost of providing significant training 
would diminish. Setting the expungement roster aside from 
other customer or industry cases would also mitigate other 
selection pressures. The financial services industry always 
participates in customer or industry disputes and remains a 
repeat player, allowing it to accumulate knowledge about 
arbitrators. This creates pressure for expungement arbitrators 
to favor the industry to increase the likelihood they will be 
selected for other matters. In contrast, customers with disputes 
generally appear in the forum as single-shot players. Although 
past arbitration results are disclosed and some 
customer-claimant-side counsel operate as repeat players, the 
industry will generally have more knowledge and 
sophistication. The financial services industry always appears 
in these arbitrations as a party while customers will only 
sometimes secure representation from repeat player counsel. 
Completely insulating an expungement arbitrator roster from 
these selection pressures may do significant good. 
Creating different rules for the expungement arbitrator 
roster and making it an exclusive body may also shift the way 
these arbitrators view their roles. In ordinary matters, the 
parties jointly select an arbitrator to resolve a dispute primarily 
concerning their interests. In expungement matters, the 
arbitrators must serve as gatekeepers for the public’s interest 
in maintaining access to information. Although setting them up 
in this way falls far short of an alternative regulatory process, 
it would likely do significant good. 
IV. Conclusion 
Our system of securities laws relies heavily on disclosure to 
serve as disinfecting sunlight on the theory that when more 
information comes out, it will enable better decisions. In our 
dispute resolution systems, we expect adversarial processes, on 
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balance, to surface information and provide adjudicators with 
the information they need to make informed decisions. Yet these 
assumptions do not always hold. As this article shows, 
adversarial failure can leave adjudicators bereft of significant 
information. When these processes facilitate the deletion of 
public information, the failures affect society more broadly. 
When it occurs, adversarial failure must be addressed to 
protect the integrity of decisions affecting significant groups of 
stakeholders. Although an ethics-oriented approach may shift 
behavior to a degree, it cannot entirely solve the problem. 
Ultimately, whenever adversarial failure occurs, society should 
consider alternative methods for deciding issues which better 
balance the interests at stake.  
 
  
 
  
 
